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Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling
Nicolas Cornell & Sarah E. Light*
The law contains a diverse range of doctrines — “slayer rules” that
prevent murderers from inheriting, restrictions on trade in “conflict
diamonds,” the Fourth Amendment’s exclusion of evidence obtained
through unconstitutional search, and many more — that seem to
instantiate a general principle that it can be wrong to profit from past
harms or misconduct. This Article explores the contours of this general
normative principle, which we call the wrongful benefit principle. As we
illustrate, the wrongful benefit principle places constraints both on
whether anyone should be permitted to exploit ethically tainted goods,
and who may be permitted to profit or otherwise benefit from past
wrongful or harmful conduct. We test the boundaries of the principle by
examining its application to the pressing and complex case of Arctic
drilling. The burning of fossil fuels and the resulting melting of Arctic ice
have, ironically, opened access to oil fields in the Arctic that were
previously inaccessible. In our view, the historical cause of this
opportunity is normatively significant to questions about what oil
* Copyright © 2017 Nicolas Cornell and Sarah E. Light. Assistant Professors of
Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Thanks to Brian Berkey, Eric Biber, Matt Caulfield, Peter Conti-Brown, Emily Dupraz,
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Workshop, and the Society for Applied Philosophy for comments and insights on
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extraction should be permitted in the Arctic in the future. We conclude by
suggesting the kind of legal responses — both domestic and global — that
can incorporate the wrongful benefit principle.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change, driven by past fossil fuel consumption, has begun
to open up significant portions of the Arctic Ocean that were
previously inaccessibly frozen. This new accessibility has, in turn,
created profitable new opportunities. Ironically, the most notable
opportunity is for more oil drilling.1 Drilling in such formerly
inaccessible areas of the Arctic would thus involve capitalizing on the
very environmental changes that past fossil fuel consumption has
wrought on the planet.2
Do such backward-looking considerations — facts about where the
opportunity comes from — matter? We believe that they do. Across a
range of contexts, the law operates to prevent actors from benefiting
from past harm and past wrongs. In this Article, we argue that these
doctrines coalesce around a normative idea that we call the wrongful
benefit principle, and we explore how this normative idea would apply
to the new and pressing issue of Arctic drilling.
Legally and ethically, it is often impermissible to exploit an
opportunity that has been wrongfully acquired. As an initial matter, a
perpetrator generally ought not profit from his or her own past
wrongful acts.3 For example, the person who has killed a family
member commits a further wrong when he seeks to collect and retain
life insurance payments, and judicial doctrine generally precludes
such conduct.4 The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule prevents the
prosecutor from introducing into evidence documents obtained by his
own agents’ unconstitutional search.5
Other examples demonstrate, however, that even innocent parties
who did not cause or contribute to past harms may have obligations
not to exploit them. Put another way, certain goods or opportunities
to profit themselves become “tainted” as a result of the process by
which they were acquired. Such tainted goods include stolen goods
1 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, Arctic Sea Ice Vanishes — and the Oil Rigs Move In, TIME
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://science.time.com/2012/09/11/arctic-sea-ice-vanishes-and-theoil-rigs-move-in/ (noting a U.S. Geological Survey that indicates more than 90 billion
barrels of Artic oil may be newly accessible); The Melting North, THE ECONOMIST (June
16, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21556798 (noting that large oil
companies stand to profit from the receding polar ice caps).
2 When referring to the “Arctic,” we do not mean just those areas of the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) within the jurisdiction of the United States, but the entire
Arctic Ocean, including areas governed by other nations, and areas under global
governance. See infra Parts IV, V (discussing global governance of the Arctic).
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part II.A.
5 See infra Part II.B.
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and so-called conflict or “blood” diamonds, which may raise ethical
concerns even for those entirely innocent of any role in their wrongful
procurement.6 Similarly, anti-price gouging laws may preclude
merchants from profiting as a result of a natural disaster they did not
cause by unconscionably raising prices on necessities.7
Drawing upon cases in which courts and legislators have considered
issues like these, we describe what we call the wrongful benefit
principle: it is wrong to benefit knowingly from a bad act if the benefit
one would receive is sufficiently connected to the bad act. This general
principle captures both the perpetrator-oriented cases in which a party
has caused or contributed to the past wrong him or herself, and the
object-oriented cases in which even innocent parties should not benefit
from ethically tainted goods. But the principle, as thus described, is
still only schematic. It leaves open what counts as a “bad act” and
what constitutes a “sufficiently connected” benefit. Filling these ideas
in different ways can yield stronger or weaker versions of the
principle.8
Arctic drilling in newly accessible areas — critical in its own right
— offers a new and nuanced case study through which to explore the
contours of this broader principle. Much of the controversy around
Arctic drilling pertains to forward-looking concerns about the
potential impact on the climate, the pristine environment in the Artic,
and marine life.9 However, there is arguably another, largely
overlooked dimension as well. The fact that the fossil fuels buried
below the melting Arctic ice are becoming accessible only because of
past harmful conduct in burning fossil fuels renders drilling in the
Arctic distinct. These circumstances distinguish Arctic drilling from
drilling in regions that have long been accessible in the absence of
anthropogenic climate change, offering an additional reason for seeing
it as ethically and legally problematic.
We argue that the backward-looking considerations about how we
got here matter, in some fashion or another, to what we should do
going forward. In particular, we contend that the wrongful benefit
principle places some limits both on those actors who directly
contributed to the past harm and also on what any actor may
permissibly do with drilling opportunities to profit that are arguably
“tainted” in at least some respect.10 If this is correct, it holds
6
7
8
9
10

See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
See infra Parts I, IV.
See infra Part III.A.
One of the most interesting aspects of using Arctic drilling as a case study is
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significant implications for how the international community and
domestic policy should frame questions about Arctic oil extraction, as
well as broader implications beyond the Arctic case.
This Article is structured as follows. In Part I, we begin with our
conclusion. We briefly set forth a sketch of the wrongful benefit
principle to give context for the discussion that follows, in which we
explain its derivation and examine its contours. In Part II, we examine
a range of existing judicial doctrines and legal rules that place
constraints on exploiting ethically problematic situations to tease out
insights from other contexts. From these diverse cases, we extract a
general normative principle that unifies these insights. In Part III we
offer the case study of Arctic drilling, describing the increasing
accessibility of its resources, global efforts to exploit those resources,
and the role of would-be suitors — both nation-states and the fossilfuel industry — in bringing about climate change. In Part IV, using
the case study of Arctic drilling, we examine the wrongful benefit
principle’s content, limitations, and theoretical underpinnings.
Part V shifts from a discussion of principle to the concrete world of
policy. We recommend three courses of action to effectuate the
principle in global law and policy in descending order of preference: a
moratorium on drilling in areas of the Arctic exposed by a warming
climate, adoption of global certification regime modeled after the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for conflict diamonds, and a
more expansive reading of the existing cost-benefit analysis that
informs current Arctic law by incorporating these backward-looking

that we are all, in some sense, contributors to climate change, though we do not all
have the capacity to drill for fossil fuels in the warming Arctic. See infra Part III.B. We
note, however, that our project does not entail an effort to apportion responsibility
among various contributors for their relative share of the costs of mitigation or
adaptation to climate change. There is already a rich literature both in the law and in
environmental ethics regarding who bears an obligation to pay these costs, focusing
both on nation-states, and the relative responsibility of producers and consumers. See,
e.g., Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1605 (2007) [hereinafter Basic Compensation] (arguing that compensation from
responsible parties to victims for costs of adaptation is appropriate); Matthew Adler,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (2007)
(responding to Farber’s claims for compensation); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1565 (2008) (contending that arguments
from distributive and corrective justice fail to justify “special obligations for
greenhouse gas reductions on the United States”); Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of
the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 323-39 (2010)
(examining who should pay for mitigation and adaptation costs under different
theories of justice).
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ethical norms. We make this shift consciously, to demonstrate that
taking the principle seriously has global implications.
I.

THE WRONGFUL BENEFIT PRINCIPLE

The new opportunity to access oil and gas in the Arctic poses a
fundamental question: Is there anything wrong with reaping the
benefit from a past bad act or event? We believe that there is.11 Our
aim in this Part is to describe a very rough outline of the principle at
work here, which we will then fill in, defend, and explore in the
remainder of the Article.
As a starting point, there appears to be something independently
wrong with profiting from a past harmful act or event.12 For example,
if someone kills her family member, she commits a further wrong by
inheriting the family fortune from the victim.13 The remorseful
murderer who remits her ill-gotten inheritance to a charitable cause
does less wrong than the murderer who willingly accepts the bounty
from her completed crime. Even innocent parties — be they
purchasers trying to save on a diamond engagement ring or struggling
small business owners during a hurricane14 — may be doing
something wrong by exploiting unfortunate circumstances for their
own benefit. The law exerts itself upon each of these situations — and
many other related situations — in interesting and overlapping ways
that we will explore in depth below.
But, before wading into the details of how the law handles such
situations or how any of this might matter to the Arctic, we begin by
11 Although this idea has received recent attention in a range of new contexts, see,
e.g., Ronald M. Green, Benefiting from ‘Evil’: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem
Cell Research, 16 BIOETHICS 544 (2002) (discussing profiting from morally wrong
behavior in the context of stem cell research), the basic moral thought has been
around for a very long time. See Proverbs 10:2 (New Int’l Version) (“Ill-gotten
treasures have no lasting value.”).
12 Our claim is that profiting is, as moral philosophers might put it, pro tanto
wrong. By analogy, breaking a promise is also pro tanto wrong. Despite this
wrongness, there may nonetheless be situations in which one should or must break a
promise. It is still wrong, even though it is the thing to do in these circumstances.
That an action is pro tanto wrong is not determinative of what one ought to do all
things considered; however, it is more than merely one consideration among others.
When we discuss the obligation not to benefit, we should be read as describing just
such a pro tanto duty or obligation — terms that we use interchangeably. For the
distinction between pro tanto, prima facie, and all-things-considered duties, see
Andrew E. Reisner, Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (Hugh LaFollette, ed., 2013).
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 See infra Parts II.D, II.E.
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sketching the core ethical principle, which we believe underlies all
these cases, the wrongful benefit principle: It is wrong to benefit
knowingly from a bad act if the benefit one would receive is
sufficiently connected to the bad act. This normative principle applies
to situations like that of the inheriting murderer and — depending on
how it is filled in — might extend to reach cases like that of Arctic
drilling.
As stated above, however, the principle still needs a great deal of
clarification. In particular, there are two elements that need to be filled
in further: First, what is meant by “bad act”? That is, what sorts of
actions does one have an obligation not to benefit from? Does this
principle extend beyond acts that are intentionally bad or illegal? And,
second, what does it mean to be “sufficiently connected”? That is, how
must the benefit received be related to the bad act that produced it?
Can the connection be only based on the person or entity that
committed the bad act? Or can the connection follow the object or the
goods? In what follows, we demonstrate how these two variables —
the nature of the act’s “badness,” and the connection between the bad
act and benefit received — interact to produce four different versions
of the wrongful benefit principle.
Regarding the first question, the wrongful benefit principle takes on
different character depending on what kind of culpability one
requires. In one form, it requires truly culpable wrongdoing; in
another, even innocent but harmful acts or events may trigger it.
Regarding the second question, wrongful benefit can have either a
perpetrator-oriented dimension or an object-oriented dimension. As in the
murderer case, benefitting can be wrong because the person or entity
who benefits has perpetrated the injustice from which the benefit now
flows. More recently, however, ethical theorists have noted that
remedial obligations can also be object-oriented.15 That is, due to their
history, some objects may impose on their prospective acquirers —
even innocent acquirers — an obligation to refuse or relinquish them.
Conflict diamonds, for example, arguably impose object-oriented
obligations.16

15 For more on this distinction, see Robert E. Goodin, Disgorging the Fruits of
Historical Wrongdoing, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 478 (2013); see also Edward Page &
Avia Pasternak, Guest Editor’s Introduction, 31 J. APPLIED PHIL. 331, 331 (2014).
16 See Kate Sheppard, How Do I Buy an Ethical Engagement Ring?, MOTHER JONES
(Oct. 17, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2011/10/howdo-i-buy-ethical-engagement-ring; infra Part II.D.

University of California, Davis

1852

[Vol. 50:1845

Assembling these different dimensions generates at least four
different ways to understand the wrongful benefit principle, as
described in Table 1.
Table 1

“Bad
Act”

“Sufficiently Connected”
Perpetrator-Oriented
Object-Oriented
Culpable Box 1: Profiting from
Box 3: Taking the
Acts
one’s own culpable act profits of another’s
culpable act
Innocent
But
Harmful
Acts

Box 2: Profiting from
one’s own innocent
but harmful act

Box 4: Profiting from
another’s innocent but
harmful act

These different understandings are progressively more expansive.
While we expect most readers to accept the application of the
wrongful benefit principle to cases that fall into Box 1, we recognize
that the application to Box 4 is quite a bit more contentious. The
reader who finds these more expansive understandings implausible
need not reject the wrongful benefit principle entirely, but simply take
a more conservative understanding of it. We intend the basic
framework to be acceptable to a wide range of views.
In order to defend the existence of this principle and in order to give
the framework more determinate content, we start in Part II by
considering various legal contexts that seem to instantiate a common
concern about benefitting improperly from wrongdoing or disaster. In
the subsequent Parts, we turn our lens to the Arctic, which we
consider an excellent case study for the complexities and limits of the
principle. Discussing Arctic drilling against this backdrop exerts
pressure in two different, equally important directions: first, it presses
toward a more expansive understanding of certain normative
considerations, and second, it shows how even familiar and less
expansive premises may press toward significant legal and policy
outcomes. That is, thinking about the Arctic potentially strengthens
and expands the wrongful benefit principle, and thinking about even a
minimal wrongful benefit principle would strengthen our response to
climate change and the Arctic.

Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling
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WRONGFULLY BENEFITTING IN THE LAW

In a range of contexts, the law suggests that there is something
ethically problematic with benefitting from a past bad act. In this Part,
we examine a variety of these legal doctrines. These contexts are not
intended to be comprehensive. Instead, our analysis is meant to
suggest both that there is some common normative commitment that
appears to transcend particular content areas, and that this
commitment takes a variety of forms. Diverse though they are, these
doctrines form a sufficiently unified constellation that something must
exist that holds them together.
A. Slayer Rules & Son of Sam Laws
A clear-cut example of a wrongful benefit arises when a criminal
would profit directly or indirectly from her crime. Unsurprisingly, the
law has generally evolved — through various judge- and legislaturefashioned mechanisms — to ensure the truth of the old adage that
crime does not pay.
Under what is generally called the “slayer rule,” if someone murders
her family member, she cannot then inherit the victim’s fortune.17 This
general principle has a long history, originally connected with old
common law doctrines including “corruption of blood.”18 In America,
the problem most famously came to the fore in Riggs v. Palmer.19
Elmer Palmer poisoned his grandfather, Francis Palmer, knowing that
he was to be the recipient of his grandfather’s sizeable fortune and
fearing that his grandfather might change the will.20 Elmer’s two aunts,
who were only left small legacies in the will, sought to invalidate their
father’s will.21 The court denied the murderous grandson his
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (“A slayer’s acquisition, enlargement, or accelerated possession of an
interest in property as a result of the victim’s death constitutes unjust enrichment that
the slayer will not be allowed to retain.”). See generally Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92
B.U. L. REV. 793, 804-07 (2012) (tracing the slayer rule, in part, to the maxim ex turpi
causa non oritur actio, which proclaims that, from a dishonorable cause, no claim
arises).
18 See Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty — History of Problem in Anglo-American
Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229, 241 (1942) (describing the history of legal responses to
murderous heirs).
19 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889); see also Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (predating Riggs and holding that a murderer
could not benefit under his victim’s life insurance policy).
20 Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 508-09.
21 Id. at 508.

1854

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1845

inheritance, starkly declaring that to allow the grandson to “enjoy the
fruits of his crime” would be “a reproach to the jurisprudence of our
state.”22 Contrary to the argument pressed by the dissent,23 the Riggs
court determined that denying the inheritance was not adding a
further punishment beyond the criminal sanction, but rather simply
ensuring that “he shall not acquire property by his crime, and thus be
rewarded for its commission”24 — that is, ensuring that he not
wrongfully benefit.25
Riggs is noteworthy not so much for the moral principle that it
embodies — namely, that a murderer should not inherit his victim’s
estate — which seems intuitive. Rather, what makes the case notable is
that this intuitive principle shaped the common-law decision despite
arguably having little foundation in positive law at the time.26 But, as
the Riggs court noted,27 civil law jurisdictions have long explicitly
prohibited murderers from inheriting.28 Since Riggs, most American
jurisdictions have enacted so-called “slayer statutes” that explicitly
prohibit murderers from inheriting.29
22 Id. at 512-13; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 28-29 (1977)
(describing Riggs as founded upon “the principle that no man may profit from his own
wrong”).
23 Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 519 (Gray, J., dissenting) (“[T]o concede appellants’ views
would involve the imposition of an additional punishment or penalty upon the
respondent. What power or warrant have the courts to add to the respondent’s
penalties by depriving him of property?”).
24 Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
25 The same reasoning is applied in much more mundane cases as well. See Mazzei
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 61 T.C. 497, 497 (1974) (disallowing a tax deduction
for funds stolen by a co-conspirator in a scheme to produce counterfeit currency).
26 See DWORKIN, supra note 22; cf. Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public
Policy: The Case of the Murderous Heir, 53 SMU L. REV. 31, 47 (2000) (describing the
issue in Riggs as how to define the “working relationship” between courts and the
legislature). But see Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1707-08 (1998) (arguing that the only issue in Riggs was
proper interpretation of the wills statute).
27 Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 513.
28 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 797 n.33 (citing sources).
29 See Tara L. Pehush, Comment, Maryland Is Dying for a Slayer Statute: The
Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 271,
271-72 n.9 (2005) (compiling 42 state statutes); Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of
Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 980
(2007) (finding some version of the rule in 48 states). For an early and influential
advocacy of the statutory approach, see John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by
Wilfully Killing Another — A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936). In some
jurisdictions, statutes even bar inheritance by those who have been abusers leading up
to a victim’s death. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455(1), 112.455(2)(b),
112.465(1) (2016) (covering physical or financial abuse within five years of a
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Notably, slayer rules sometimes prevent inheritance by parties who
are not legally culpable. First, some slayer statutes disinherit not merely
a murderer but also the murderer’s heirs. For example, Maryland
precludes even uninvolved, innocent heirs from inheriting through a
murderer.30 Second, some states do not require a criminal conviction to
preclude inheritance. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has
recently joined other states in holding that the state’s slayer statute bars
inheritance even where the would-be heir was found not guilty by
reason of insanity.31 In North Dakota, it was determined that the slayer
statute applies even where the killer is too young to be charged with a
felony.32 What these details of the slayer rule suggest is that the rule is
ultimately concerned not with a perpetrator’s culpability per se but with
wrongful inheritance. We prevent parties from benefitting from violence
in which they participated, even if perhaps not in a way that was
criminally culpable. But we also, at times, go further to preclude parties
— even entirely innocent parties — from benefiting from the wrongful
conduct of others.
The general principle behind the slayer rule — that one ought not
profit from crime — is not limited to inheritance cases.33 Legislatures
have often sought to prevent criminals from profiting from their
crimes in other ways as well. Most famously, after rumors circulated
that publishers and the film industry were considering giving large
sums of money to David Berkowitz, the convicted “Son of Sam” serial
killer, the New York state legislature passed a law requiring that
profits from such publications or films be held in escrow for the
purpose of paying victims who obtain a civil judgment.34 Similar socalled “Son of Sam laws” have now been enacted federally and in most

testator’s death).
30 See Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231, 1231-32 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (“Because
the slayer never acquired a beneficial interest in the victim’s estate, anyone claiming
through the slayer, even though innocent of any wrong doing, may not share in the
victim’s estate.”).
31 In re Estate of Kissinger, 206 P.3d 665, 666 (Wash. 2009); see also Osman v.
Osman, 737 S.E.2d 876, 876 (Va. 2013) (applying slayer rule in case of insanity);
Congleton v. Sansom, 664 So. 2d 276, 277-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (applying
Florida slayer statute in case of insanity).
32 In re Estates of Josephson, 297 N.W.2d 444, 449 (N.D. 1980).
33 See Kathleen Howe, Is Free Speech Too High a Price to Pay for Crime?
Overcoming the Constitutional Inconsistencies in Son of Sam Laws, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 341, 344-45 (2004) (characterizing Riggs v. Palmer as “lay[ing] grounds” for Son
of Sam laws).
34 See N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(1) (2011).
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American states.35 Whereas general forfeiture statutes take the direct
proceeds from the commission of a crime, Son of Sam laws target
profits arising indirectly from the notoriety a crime produces.36 This
raises complex First Amendment issues, which led to New York’s
original law being struck down by the Supreme Court.37 But the Court
acknowledged that “[t]he State . . . has an undisputed compelling
interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes” and
that a better tailored law might survive review.38 While Son of Sam
laws continue to be challenged,39 they also continue to bear on highprofile criminals ranging from “real housewives” stars,40 to the “Wolf
of Wall Street.”41
Slayer rules and Son of Sam laws share a common underlying
motivation to ensure that criminals not be allowed to profit from their
crimes. While laws sometimes have ancillary justifications in terms of
deterring crime or compensating victims, their real moral thrust seems
to be aimed at preventing a benefit that is perceived as wrongful.
B. Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, which prevents the
state from benefitting at trial from an unconstitutional search or
seizure, offers another example of a legal prohibition on benefitting
from a wrong.
At common law, evidence improperly obtained by the state — if
relevant — could be introduced in a criminal prosecution.42 In the
35 See, e.g., Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 40 P.3d 718, 721-22 (Cal. 2002)
(overturning California’s “Son of Sam law” as applied to the kidnapper of Frank
Sinatra, Jr.).
36 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (2012); David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal
Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 428-29 (1988).
37 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
38 Id. at 119.
39 See Lindsey R. Hammitt, What’s Wrong with the Picture? Reviewing Prison Arts in
America, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 575, 578, 605-07 (2011) (discussing challenges
to Son of Sam laws by statutes and case law).
40 See Vicki Hyman, ‘Real Housewives’ sentencing: Do ‘Son of Sam’ laws apply to Joe
and Teresa Giudice?, N.J. STAR-LEDGER (Oct. 3, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.nj.com/
entertainment/celebrities/index.ssf/2014/10/joe_and_teresa_giudice_sentencing_son_
of_sam.html.
41 See William Schindler, Punishing the Wolf of Wall Street: Jordan Belfort’s Second
Act, BRIGHT LIGHTS FILM J. (June 19, 2014), http://brightlightsfilm.com/punishing-wolfwall-street-jordan-belforts-second-act.
42 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting the
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1914 case of Weeks v. United States, however, the Supreme Court
created a judicial remedy in criminal cases that excluded evidence
obtained by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment.43
Subsequent cases made clear that the exclusionary rule applied not
only to the primary evidence that was illegally seized, but also to
evidence subsequently discovered that was derivative of the illegal
search, unless such evidence was obtained by means that were
sufficiently “attenuated as to dissipate the taint.”44 Such derivative
evidence became known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”45
In fashioning the exclusionary rule, the Court offered two
interwoven rationales. First, the Court explained that exclusion was
necessary to ensure meaningful Fourth Amendment protection.46
Second, the Court held that sanctioning unconstitutional conduct by
admitting wrongfully seized evidence would render the Court
complicit in the wrongdoing and thus undermine judicial integrity.47
In other words, the exclusionary rule was originally envisioned both
as a mechanism for deterring constitutional violations and as a way of
distancing the judiciary from involvement with tainted objects and
evidence. A great deal of subsequent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has been devoted to exploring and developing these
ideas, with the deterrence-based rationale largely taking precedence.48
idea that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered”).
43 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
44 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
45 Id.
46 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
47 Id. at 392 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country
to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . .
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts.” (emphasis added)).
48 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (holding that the
“exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent
benefits”); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011) (noting that the “sole
purpose” of the exclusionary rule is deterrence); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (holding that the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits when
officers act in good faith reliance on a warrant that is subsequently found
constitutionally defective); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 352 (1974)
(rejecting extension of exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings on the basis that
such an extension would have minimal marginal deterrent effect); Robert M. Bloom,
Judicial Integrity: A Call for its Reemergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 471 (1993) (arguing the judicial integrity concept has
been supplanted by the deterrence rationale); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 179 (1998) (“[United States v. Leon] completes the Court’s
abandonment of the ‘judicial integrity’ rationale for Fourth Amendment exclusion.”
(alteration added)). The dominance of the deterrence rationale remains contested,
however. See Utah v. Strieff, 126 S. Ct. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing both
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In this rich line of cases, one can see the Court wrestling with both
object-oriented and perpetrator-oriented issues. After Weeks
introduced the exclusionary rule, the question immediately arose
regarding which objects were tainted in the relevant way. In Olmstead
v. United States, the Court — over vigorous dissent — answered the
question somewhat narrowly, holding that only evidence obtained
through unconstitutional conduct, and not conduct that was merely
illegal under state law or otherwise unethical, would be excluded.49 In
Olmstead, federal officials had obtained evidence via a wiretap, which
was illegal under state law at that time.50 The majority refused to
exclude the illegally obtained evidence, reasoning that viewing such
merely illegal evidence as tainted would frustrate too many
prosecutions, to the detriment of social order.51 In separate dissents,
Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes each advocated a broader reading
of the exclusionary rule that would serve to condemn the illegal
conduct. Brandeis contended that by availing themselves of the
evidence obtained illegally by individual federal officers, the federal
officials “assumed moral responsibility for the [individual] officers’
crimes.”52 Along similar lines, Justice Holmes declared that the law is
undermined when the state “knowingly accepts and pays . . . for the
fruits [of crime].”53 In their view, evidentiary objects became tainted
through any illegality, not merely unconstitutionality.
In addition to these questions about the scope of evidence that is
precluded, subsequent cases have raised questions about the extent to
which the rule is limited to the actual perpetrator. One anomaly
particularly tested these limits. From 1914, when the Court decided
Weeks, until 1961 when it held that the exclusionary rule applied to
state action through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, the
exclusionary rule applied to searches by federal officials, but not
searches by state officials.54 This forced the Court to determine what to
do if state officials obtained evidence in a manner that would have
deterrence and judicial integrity rationales for exclusion, and favoring exclusion of
“evidence obtained by exploiting misconduct”).
49 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 481-83 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 485 (“Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.”).
53 Id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
54 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
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been unconstitutional had the search been conducted by federal
officials. In such cases, those state officers could simply hand the
evidence to federal officials for federal criminal prosecution. The
Court initially approved of such procedures — under what became
known as the “silver platter doctrine” — reasoning that the
exclusionary rule concerned only federal officials’ misconduct, not
tainted evidence per se.55 But, after several cases tested the bounds of
the silver platter doctrine, the Court eventually rejected the doctrine
in Elkins v. United States, holding that the Fourth Amendment barred
introduction of evidence at a federal criminal trial that had been
improperly obtained by state officials.56 In extending the rule beyond
evidence from federal perpetrators, the Court appealed again to both
deterrence-based rationales — stifling collusion, subterfuge, and
forum shopping, and encouraging lawful cooperation57 — as well as
integrity-based rationales — avoiding “making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of law.”58 Other cases have
continued to test the extent to which the exclusionary rule attaches to
perpetrators or to the resulting evidence.59
In the doctrine developed under the exclusionary rule, one can see
how any principle of wrongful benefit confronts both a perpetratororiented dimension (meaning that one’s own or one’s agent’s own past
bad acts may limit one’s ability to profit in the future), and an objectoriented dimension (meaning that the taint may follow the goods
55 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 n.2 (1960) (citing Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1819) for the first use of the term “silver platter”).
56 Id. at 208-15. Elkins was decided one year before Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
57 Id. at 217.
58 Id. at 223 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345); see also id. at
223 (citing dissents of Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 for the
proposition that the government, through its conduct, is “the omnipresent teacher”).
59 In 1921, the Court rejected the idea that evidence obtained illegally by a private
citizen and provided to federal officials should be excluded in a federal criminal trial.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Justices Brandeis and Holmes
dissented, again relying on normative principles. Id. at 476-77 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that to permit the government to profit from the wrongful acts
of another — including a private citizen — would “shock the common man’s sense of
decency and fair play”); cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding,
over dissent, that suppression of evidence obtained unconstitutionally by state officers
in a federal civil federal tax enforcement proceeding was not warranted, because no
additional deterrent was required if the exclusionary rule would bar introduction of
the evidence in both federal and state criminal trials). For more discussion of the
subsequent cases that tested the extent of the exclusionary rule and their impact, see
Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7
(2012) (suggesting that the Court has resurrected a new version of the silver platter
doctrine by creating exceptions to the exclusionary rule in collateral proceedings).
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themselves from which another seeks to benefit in certain
circumstances). It also illustrates the multiplicity of possible rationales
for such a principle, including deterrence of future bad acts,
expressive notions of the law as teacher, avoidance of complicity in
the bad act, or preventing the exploitation of a morally troubling
situation.
C. Stolen Goods
The law of stolen goods provides a clear example of how goods
themselves can become tainted as a result of a sufficiently wrongful act
— and how that “taint” prevents even a bona fide purchaser from
acquiring good title or otherwise freely transferring such goods to
others. Thus, unlike most slayer rules and Son of Sam laws, the focus
of legal and ethical reasoning is on the fact that the goods were
wrongfully acquired, rather than on the identity of the perpetrator.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the law offers certain
protections to good faith purchasers for value in order to promote
commerce in the marketplace.60 A “good faith” or “bona fide”
purchaser is a person who purchases property from a seller without
knowledge of any impropriety regarding how the object was
acquired.61 If the seller engaged in certain bad acts to purchase the
goods from the original owner, such as deceit, fraud, or purchase with
a bad check, the good faith purchaser for value still acquires title to
the goods. However, that title is “voidable,” such that the original
owner may void the title before the sale to a good faith purchaser
through legal action.62 If the original owner who was defrauded in the
transaction fails to protect her interests in time, the bona fide
purchaser can then freely hold and alienate the goods.

60 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 269, 277-80 (2016) (discussing historical development of the common law
doctrines regarding good faith purchasers); see U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (“A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor
had power to transfer . . . .”); Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1058 (1954).
61 Balganesh, supra note 60, at 271; see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1333-34 (2011)
(noting that different jurisdictions outside the United States have different rules on
good faith purchasers, complicating the treatment of recovery of stolen goods
internationally).
62 U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(a)–(d) (“A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”) (listing four types of bad act that result
in voidable title).
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However, there is one bad act — theft — that has been deemed
sufficiently pernicious that even a good faith purchase by an innocent
purchaser cannot cleanse the taint on the goods. In his commentaries,
William Blackstone cited the rule: “But if my goods are stolen from me,
and sold, out of market overt, my property is not altered, and I may take
them wherever I find them.”63 One who obtains stolen goods from a
thief does not acquire title to those goods, even if that purchaser acts in
“good faith” and purchases the goods for value.64 This rule goes back to
the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet, meaning that one cannot
convey a right greater than that which one has.65
Art theft offers a high-profile context in which the law of stolen
goods has played out. In 1976, Georgia O’Keefe brought suit to
compel the return of paintings that she alleged had been stolen from a
gallery run by her husband, the late Alfred Stieglitz.66 The paintings
were in the possession of an alleged bona fide owner, who claimed that
his father had obtained them legally. While the court determined that
the factual dispute over whether they had actually been stolen
precluded summary judgment, it announced that the case should be
determined based on the long-standing principle that “if the paintings
were stolen, the thief acquired no title and could not transfer good
title to others regardless of their good faith and ignorance of the
theft.”67 Similarly, in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, the
New York Court of Appeals considered the case of an allegedly stolen
63 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *449; Balganesh, supra note 60, at 283
(“The law views the crime of theft as sufficiently harmful and worthy of
condemnation that it attaches the taint to the seller’s possession right away, without
the need for any action on the part of the owner for the taint to attach.”). Note that
the doctrine of “market overt,” which Blackstone mentions, does not apply in the
United States. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 1334-37.
64 Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mendenhall, 937 P.2d 69, 73 (Nev. 1997) (“[A]ny
title derived from a thief . . . is . . . considered void . . . .” (citing Suburban Motors,
Inc. v. State Farm, 268 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (1990))); Saltus & Saltus v. Everett, 20
Wend. 267, 282 (N.Y. 1838) (discussing that in cases of theft the owner “can follow
and reclaim [her property] in the hands of any person, however innocent” (alteration
in original)); Ogden v. Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 182, 195 (1854) (“In this country no one
can obtain title to stolen property . . . however innocent he may have been in the
purchase; public policy forbids the acquisition of title through the thief.”); Pate v.
Elliott, 400 N.E. 2d 910, 912 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a title procured from
a thief is void); see also Candela v. Port Motors, Inc., 617 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) (“[I]f it is proven that Port purchased the vehicle from an actual car thief,
or from the successor in interest to a car thief, then Port’s title would be void . . . .”) .
65 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 61, at 1335.
66 O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1980).
67 Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted). Recovery by the owner may be limited by the
applicable statute of limitations. See id. at 493.
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Chagall gouache. This court also reiterated the longstanding rule that
the owner of stolen property may recover that property “even if it is in
the possession of a good-faith purchaser for value.”68
While these stolen art decisions are partly motivated by an
instrumental concern about deterring “illicit trafficking in stolen
art,”69 they also display an unwillingness to become “a haven for
cultural property stolen abroad,”70 reflecting a distaste for harboring
objects with a tainted history.
D. Conflict Diamonds
Another example of goods becoming tainted for subsequent
purchasers through the past wrongful acts of others are so-called
conflict diamonds.71 Conflict diamonds are “rough diamonds used by
rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at
undermining legitimate governments.”72 There is no difference
between the two physical objects — a “conflict” diamond and a
conflict-free diamond — just as there is no material difference
between oil or gas extracted from the Arctic and oil or gas extracted
elsewhere.73 It is the process by which the diamonds were acquired
68 Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 427-29 (N.Y. 1991)
(declining to impose any duty of “reasonable diligence” on the owners for purposes of
the statute of limitations).
69 Id. at 431.
70 Id. (quoting the Governor of New York’s veto statement of a bill that would
have changed the rule).
71 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 615-21 (2004) (discussing
the ethics of avoiding conflict diamonds and other “process-based purchasing
decisions”); Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2003); Conflict
Diamonds, U.S. DEP’T ST. (January 31, 2017, 12:26 AM), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/
tfs/tfc/diamonds/index.htm.3. See generally Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds,
International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 835
(2003). Other examples include ivory from elephant tusks, and so-called “slavery
chocolate.” See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40 (2016); Kysar, supra at 615-16 (discussing a
connection between the chocolate trade and child slavery in West Africa); Morgan V.
Manley, The Inter(national) Strategy: An Ivory Trade Ban in the United States and China,
38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1511 (2015) (discussing limitations on ivory trade).
72 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, § I, at 3 (2016), https://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document-version-2016-0.
73 See Kysar, supra note 71, at 532 (“Just as money is not purely fungible to social
beings, consumer products — even when physically indistinguishable — are not
perfect substitutes to the extent that they are produced using different processes about
which consumers have strong feelings.”). Kysar laments the fact that international law
affords insufficient weight to the processes by which goods enter the market,
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and the purpose toward which the profits from their sale would be
used that raise issues of moral taint.74
Recognizing these concerns, a group of nations from southern Africa
met in Kimberley, South Africa in 2000 to discuss how to end the
trade in such diamonds.75 Subsequently, in December, 2000, the
United Nations adopted Resolution 55/56 calling upon Members to
create certification standards for diamonds.76 In 2003, the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme (Kimberley Process) entered into force to
“control trade in rough diamonds between participating countries
through domestic implementation of a certification scheme.”77 The
Kimberley Process requires rough diamonds to be shipped in sealed
containers with a certification that the diamonds have not benefitted
rebel movements.78 Each member state must adopt national legislation
and create or empower institutions to prevent conflict diamonds from
“entering the legitimate [diamond] trade.”79 The Kimberley Process
recognizes that “trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious
international concern, which can be directly linked to the fueling of
armed conflict, the activities of rebel movements . . . and the illicit
traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments.”80
As in the case of stolen goods, conflict diamonds are an example of
object-oriented ethical concerns. While the Kimberley Process
arguably limits the potential profits for the perpetrators who extracted
these diamonds, the moral “taint” follows the goods to limit the ability
of even innocent actors to benefit as well. Just as merchants are bound
by these certification procedures, such moral obligations may also be
including by child labor, and suggests that such preferences should be accommodated
through better information disclosure as “outlets for public-minded behavior.” Id. at
534, 615-23. We agree, and argue that the wrongful benefit principle should apply.
See infra Part V.
74 Price, supra note 71, at 7-25 (discussing origins of conflict diamonds and
political upheaval in the nations in which they are mined).
75 Id. at 34.
76 Id. (citing U.N. GAOR., 55th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56
(2001)).
77 Conflict Diamonds, supra note 71. The Kimberley Process is an “international,
multi-stakeholder initiative created to increase transparency and oversight in the
diamond industry in order to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds.” Id.
78 Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, supra note 72, at §§ II (certificate must
accompany shipment), III (no trade with non-participants), IV (tamper-resistant
containers), and Annex I (contents of Certificates).
79 About, KIMBERLEY PROCESS (Feb. 1, 2017 1:07 PM) https://www.kimberleyprocess.
com/en/about. Pursuant to this obligation, in 2003, Congress enacted the Clean Diamond
Trade Act of 2003. Clean Diamond Trade Act of 2003, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3913 (2012).
80 Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme, supra note 72, Preamble, at 1.
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relevant to the ultimate consumers of such goods.81 This certification
procedure may reflect an underlying motivation to avoid contributing
to those who continue to commit wrongful acts or to avoid
“complicity” in such wrongful acts.82 To deny even “innocent”
purchasers or merchants the ability to benefit from such tainted goods
may send an expressive message condemning the wrongful nature of
the act through which such goods were acquired. It may further
manifest respect for the victims of the harm.83
E. Price Gouging in Natural Disasters
All of the examples above involve some form of bad act. The act may
have been intentionally harmful (as in the slayer rule) or
unconstitutional (as in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). In
some cases, the bad act was performed by the same actor seeking to
profit or benefit; while in other cases, the actor is different (as in the
case of the innocent purchaser of stolen goods, merchants in the
diamond trade, or the silver platter doctrine).
But sometimes the world simply suffers a disaster of arguably
“natural” origins — a so-called “act of God.” Should anyone be
permitted to profit from such disasters — even those who played no
role in creating the bad situation? In at least one context we think that
the answer is “no.” To date, more than thirty states and the District of

81 See Kysar, supra note 71, at 616. Consumers may seek to influence the process
by which such goods become available through their purchasing decisions, or may
simply view their choices “as moral acts that have personal significance irrespective of
their instrumental effects.” Id. at 532.
82 Kysar notes that consumers may be motivated by a desire to avoid helping those
who extract resources in a harmful manner, or to avoid being “complicit with
practices they regard as immoral.” Id. (“[s]ome people do not want to benefit from or
be associated with what they regard as wickedness even if they are unable to prevent
it.” (citing Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction — An
Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 275
(2000))); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 709 (2003) (“[P]eople feel a ‘moral taint’
as a result of an association with wrongful behavior over which they had no control
and therefore for which, under traditional individualistic premises, they carry no
blame.”). Posner and Vermeule offer examples not only of taint from past actions, but
also of forward-looking behavior (such as a seller refusing to sell a knife that he
knows may be used to kill someone). In their view, “people might try to wipe away
the feeling of moral taint after it occurs. A natural way to remove the stain of moral
taint is to make an apology, do good works, or pay reparations — depending on the
nature of the associated conduct.” Id. at 709-10.
83 See infra Part IV.B (discussing foundations of the wrongful benefit principle).
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Columbia have enacted anti-price gouging or anti-profiteering laws.84
These laws preclude merchants from selling certain necessities such as
food, medicine, fuel, or other emergency supplies for what is often
described as an “unconscionable price” — meaning a price
significantly higher than the average price on a day prior to the natural
disaster or state of emergency. At least one state refers to an attempt
by merchants or suppliers to profit under such circumstances as
“profiteering,”85 while others refer to it as “unconscionable” conduct.86
Among the offered rationales for such anti-price gouging statutes is
that no one should be permitted to benefit excessively from natural
disasters. For example, the Attorney General of North Carolina has
observed, “A hurricane shouldn’t be an excuse to rip off customers.”87
The Attorney General of Florida has explained:
[W]hen we are in a state of emergency, if there is a gross disparity between what the store was charging before the emergency arose and then afterwards, it’s very clear that that is not
making a profit. That’s profiteering at the expense of people at
a time of need.88
84 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-31-1 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-301 (2017); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 396 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-232 (2017); D.C. CODE §§ 284101 to -4102 (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 101-393.4 to -397 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209-9 (2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48603 (2013); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 465.10–.30 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.11 to 4-6-9.1-7 (2016); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 61-31.1(714) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-6,106 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.374 (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:732
(2016); ME. STAT. tit. 10, § 1105 (2017); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.18 (2017); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 75-24-25 (2017); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.030 (2017); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-107 (2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r(1)-(2) (2017); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-38 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 777.1–777.5 (2017); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 401.960–.970 (2016); Pa Price Gouging Act, P.L. 1210, No. 133 (Oct. 31,
2006); 30 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 30-15-19 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145 (2016);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47–18-5101 to -5104 (2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(27) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-41-101 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9,
§ 2461d (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-527 (2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6J-1
(2016); WISC. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 106-01 to -03 (2017).
85 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,106 (2017).
86 Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Mass., New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia employ this language. See
sources cited supra note 84. Some states, like North Carolina, note that it is reasonable
to increase a price if the seller’s own costs have risen. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-38 (2017).
87 Hurricane Joaquin Puts North Carolina Price Gouging Law Into Effect, N.C.
CONSUMERS COUNCIL (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.ncconsumer.org/news-articles/
hurricane-joaquin-puts-north-carolina-price-gouging-law-into-effect.html.
88 Edward J. Page & Min K. Cho, Price Gouging 101: Call to Florida Lawmakers to
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As this statement captures, we generally take there to be a difference
between seeking profit and seeking to exploit a tragedy or disaster.
The distinction means that even a struggling small business owner
may be in the wrong should she try to benefit at the expense of
affluent customers ill-prepared for the disaster, who are willing to pay
exorbitant prices.89
F.

Unjust Enrichment

We would be remiss if we did not advert to the law of unjust
enrichment, as it raises similar issues to those that motivate our
discussion. On its face, unjust enrichment constitutes an entire legal
category devoted to the idea that legal liability may attach to
improperly benefitting.90 For example, one general principle of unjust
enrichment and restitution is that “a person is not permitted to profit
by his own wrong.”91 Unjust enrichment law also addresses cases in
which a person benefits from the inadvertent act of another, such as a
mistaken payment,92 or a benefit from natural causes, such as the
migration of natural gas through a geological formation.93 Some of
these cases bear a great similarity to our central case.
In fact, the breadth of unjust enrichment law is reflected in its
transdoctrinal nature. The Restatement acknowledges that the
principles underlying the law of unjust enrichment are expressed in
Perfect Florida’s Price Gougin Law, 80 FLA. B.J. 49 (Apr. 2006), https://www.floridabar.org/
divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/011F2B0D680BA7DB8525713B005DCD54.
89 This point suggests that the concerns about wrongful benefits are not motivated
by concerns about distributive justice and the overall fairness of the allocation of
resources in society. For a discussion of the normative principles that do motivate our
account, see infra Part IV.B.
90 See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2005); Warren Seavey & Austin
Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 31 (1938).
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 & cmts. a–c
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (discussing this principle as a basis for the remedy of
disgorgement, even if the profit realized exceeds the claimant’s loss); see, e.g., Kane v.
Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 85 So. 3d 1112, 1113-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012) (affirming judgment of unjust enrichment against attorneys who “engineer[ed]
a secret $14.5 million global settlement” of their clients’ claims that resulted in the
attorneys receiving millions in fees and plaintiffs receiving a pittance).
92 See, e.g., State ex rel. Zoeller v. Aisin USA Mfg., Inc., 946 N.E.2d 1148, 1157
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the State could pursue a common-law unjust
enrichment claim to recover an erroneously issued refund).
93 See, e.g., Beck v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 1999)
(upholding verdict of unjust enrichment in favor of landowners against natural gas
drilling firm that benefitted by storing natural gas in a subsurface reservoir under their
property without contractual leasing rights).

2017]

Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling

1867

other areas of the law, including contract law, the law of fraudulent
conveyance, restitution provisions in criminal law, and the laws of
bona fide purchase, among others.94 Many of the specific examples
already described in this Part might be said to fall within the ambit of
unjust enrichment.95 Insofar as this is true, our project might be
understood as exploring the implication of certain unjust enrichment
principles. The law of unjust enrichment expresses a commitment to
many of the same values that underlie our focus — and thus reinforces
our normative account.
But there are also important differences between unjust enrichment
law and the wrongful benefit principle. According to the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, “[a] person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution.”96 This means that unjust enrichment requires more than
merely an improper benefit but also some corresponding loss by
another. As one court put it, “Unjust enrichment requires a showing
of an enrichment, an impoverishment, and a connection between the
two.”97 Unjust enrichment is inherently relational, like other forms of
private law such as contract and tort; there must be a plaintiff and a
defendant, and the defendant must have benefitted at the plaintiff’s
expense.98
Relatedly, the law of unjust enrichment is concerned with remedies
like restitution and disgorgement that either seek to restore the
plaintiff to her position prior to her loss, or to eliminate the
defendant’s gain by transferring it to the plaintiff. The remedies for
unjust enrichment can vary under different circumstances, and may
range from a court order to restore the plaintiff to her position prior to
the harm, to an order to disgorge the defendant’s unjust gain (even if
94

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. g.
See id. § 45 (discussing the slayer rule); id. § 66 (discussing the bona fide
purchaser).
96 Id. § 1; see also id. §1 cmt. a (noting that “‘at the expense of another’ can also
mean ‘in violation of the other’s legally protected rights’”). This statement of course
begs the question as to what makes an enrichment “unjust.”
97 BTA Oil Producers v. MDU Res. Grp., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 873, 882 (N.D. 2002).
98 HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC
VALUES 1 (1997) (describing unjust enrichment as “the third branch of civil liability
(along with contracts and torts)”); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (“Restitution is the law of nonconsensual and
nonbargained benefits in the same way that torts is the law of nonconsensual and
nonlicensed harms.”). Unjust enrichment is thus a parallel source of liability and basis
for recovery. However, it is subordinated to contract remedies that have been
bargained for. See Clapp v. Goffstown Sch. Dist., 977 A.2d 1021, 1025 (N.H. 2009);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d.
95
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larger than the plaintiff’s loss) as measured by different criteria, such
as the defendant’s proceeds, profits, or the fair market value of the
resource.99 Regardless, it is deeply and inherently relational —
concerned with doing justice between two parties.
In contrast, the wrongful benefit principle is not relational in this
way. Our focus is simply on whether — and to what extent — it is
permissible for a single party to benefit from a past bad act. We are
thus not concerned with private remedies, with who can sue whom to
recover ill-gotten gains, or with how to measure the damages to be
recovered. Rather, our focus is a normative principle embodying the
view that past actions should create a moral obligation not to benefit
in the first place.100 It says something about what ought not be done,
but says little about who might be wronged by such conduct. As a
result, our policy prescriptions are rooted in public, not private law.
***
As these cases demonstrate, the wrongful benefit principle plays a
role in a diverse range of legal contexts. In some instances, such as
slayer statutes and the exclusionary rule, its perpetrator-oriented
dimensions exert a stronger influence. In other contexts, such as
conflict diamonds and stolen goods, its object-oriented dimensions
predominate. Sometimes the trigger is culpable wrongdoing, like
murder or theft, while in other instances even acts or events for which
no one bears culpability, like children’s acts or natural disasters, may
generate the relevant obligations. In the next Part, we offer the
possibility of drilling in a warming Arctic as a particularly complex,
contemporary case study that will help us to understand better not
only the outer limits of the wrongful benefit principle, but what gives
the principle its normative force.
III. A MODERN CASE STUDY: ARCTIC DRILLING
There is, if nothing else, an irony in the fact that climate change
caused by the burning of fossil fuels has generated access to more
fossil fuels. Certain actions that we now appreciate to have been
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e;
DAGAN, supra note 98, at 12 (discussing alternative measures of recovery).
100 One way to illustrate the difference is by noting that, unlike a relational duty,
which can normally be waived by the prospective victim, the obligation not to profit
may seem to exist irrespective of any other party’s response. For example, it might be
wrong for the murdering heir to inherit even if the murder victim were to consent
explicitly to such inheritance in spite of the crime. The inheritance might be wrong,
though not wrong to the victim.

2017]

Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling

1869

harmful — taken by a whole range of different actors, often innocently
but sometimes negligently or even nefariously — have created new
opportunities for profit. Arctic drilling is thus a timely and extremely
important context in which to examine not only the outer limits of the
wrongful benefit principle, but also whether the principle may have
any role to play in the concrete world of policy.
In this Part, we examine the global race to exploit the Arctic’s
increasingly accessible resources, and the role of would-be suitors for
Arctic resources — both nation-states and the fossil-fuel industry — in
bringing about the climate change that has made these resources
accessible. In the following Part, we apply the wrongful benefit
principle in each of its forms to Arctic drilling.
A. The Changing Race for Arctic Resources
The United States Geological Survey has estimated that the Arctic
holds one fifth of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and
natural gas reserves, as well as mineral resources such as rare earth
metals, iron ore, and nickel.101 As nations around the globe see
exploiting these resources as a matter of national energy security, both
investor-owned and state-owned oil and gas firms have made efforts to
extract them. In the past, such efforts — both in the United States and
elsewhere — have been limited and have largely come to nothing.
But now the climate is changing in the Arctic. As the climate warms,
Arctic oil resources are becoming more accessible, and this trend will
only continue. The polar regions of the Earth are warming more
quickly than other regions. According to the NASA Goddard Institute,
over the past forty years, while the Earth’s overall average temperature
has warmed by 1.44 degrees Fahrenheit, the Arctic has warmed by
over 3.5 degrees.102 This warming has dramatically increased the
length of the so-called “open water season” in the Arctic — the period
during which oil and gas drilling can occur. Over the last thirty years,
the Department of the Interior (DOI) has concluded that the average
101 Philip Budzik, Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 6
(Oct. 2009), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf; Jessica
Robertson, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas
Assessed in the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (July 23, 2008), https://archive.usgs.gov/
archive/sites/www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp-ID=1980.html; see also CircumArctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic
Circle, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs20083049.pdf.
102 Kristyn Ecochard, What’s causing the poles to warm faster than the rest of Earth?,
NASA (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/warmingpoles.html.
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length of the open water season during which there is less than ten
percent ice concentration in the central Chukchi Sea of the Arctic has
lengthened by approximately four weeks, to a summer average of
seventeen weeks.103
In addition to improved drilling conditions, high oil prices in the
late 2000s increased the impetus toward offshore Arctic drilling.104 In
2008, when oil prices peaked, several major oil and gas firms
purchased significant leases on the Outer Continental Shelf of
Alaska.105 In the summer of 2015, Shell began exploratory drilling,
prompting significant protests by environmental groups.106 And that’s
just the United States. Internationally, a number of countries, notably
including Russia and China, have actively pursued opportunities to
access natural resources in the Arctic, highlighting their growing
strategic importance.107 To stake its claims to the Arctic, in 2007,
Russia planted a titanium Russian flag on the seabed directly under the
North Pole.108 In January 2016, Norway approved a production rig at
Eni SpA’s Goliat field — the northernmost rig in the world.109

103 BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CHUKCHI SEA
PLANNING AREA: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 25 (2011).
104 David Hults, Environmental Regulation at the Frontier: Government Oversight of
Offshore Drilling North of Alaska, 44 ENV’T L. 761, 783 n.146 (2014) (noting that
interest in Arctic drilling has depended upon economic factors including the price of
oil and the increasing accessibility of the region).
105 See, e.g., Robert Grattan, Questions linger for ConocoPhillips on Arctic drilling
program following Shell’s OK, FUELFIX (May 12, 2015), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/
05/12/questions-linger-for-conocophillips-on-arctic-drilling-program-following-shellsok/ (discussing ConocoPhillips’ 2008 purchases of leases).
106 See Coral Davenport, Shell Wins Final Permission for Arctic Oil and Gas Drilling,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/shell-wins-finalpermission-for-arctic-oil-and-gas-drilling.html; see also Coral Davenport, U.S. Will
Allow Drilling for Oil in Arctic Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, (May 11, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/us/white-house-gives-conditional-approval-forshell-to-drill-in-arctic.html.
107 See Gary Roughead, In the Race for Arctic Energy, the U.S. and Russia are Polar
Opposites, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2015, 6:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-therace-for-arctic-energy-the-u-s-and-russia-are-polar-opposites-1440542608; Press Release,
Gazprom Neft, Second Well Brought into Production at Neft Prirazlomnoye Field (Aug.
19, 2015), http://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/news/1108569/.
108 Adrian Blomfield, Russian submarine plants flag at North Pole, TELEGRAPH (Aug.
1, 2007, 11:43 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1559264/Russiansubmarine-plants-flag-at-North-Pole.html.
109 See Eni Delivers First Oil From Goliat in the Barents Sea, OFFSHORE (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2016/03/eni-delivers-first-oil-from-goliat-in-thebarents-sea.html.
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Low oil prices blunted some of this momentum, both for U.S.-based
and other global energy firms.110 Between 2008 and today, the price of
oil has fallen from a high of approximately $140/barrel to less than
$50/barrel.111 A number of other firms have relinquished their leases
in the U.S. Arctic waters in light of these economic realities.112
Regulatory responses have followed. In October 2015, the DOI
announced that it would cancel two potential Arctic offshore lease
sales set for 2016 and 2017 in light of market conditions.113 Low oil
prices contributed to these retreats.114
The prospect of drilling for fossil fuels in the Arctic has garnered
significant opposition from environmental organizations. These
objections to Arctic drilling have focused almost exclusively on the
environmental consequences of such drilling.115 The main fear appears
to be that oil and gas exploration cannot occur without incident in the
harsh conditions of the Arctic Ocean, creating the prospect of an oil
spill in a remote area of wilderness where cleanup might be near
110 See Chester Dawson, Chevron Suspends Arctic Offshore Drilling Program in
Canada ‘Indefinitely’, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 17, 2014, 7:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/chevron-suspends-arctic-offshore-drilling-program-in-canada-1418862814
(citing “uncertainty over the outlook for crude prices”); Grattan, supra note 105;
Mikael Holter, Statoil Puts Arctic Exploration on Hold After Oil-Price Plunge, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 29, 2015, 6:58 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-29/
statoil-puts-arctic-exploration-on-hold-after-oil-price-plunge; Clifford Krauss &
Stanley Reed, Shell Exits Arctic as Slump in Oil Prices Forces Industry Retrench, N. Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/international/
royal-dutch-shell-alaska-oil-exploration-halt.html.
111 Cushing OK WTI Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.
eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D (last visited May 3,
2017); Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=D (last visited May 3, 2017).
112 See Phil Taylor, Global companies give back most U.S. leases, GREENWIRE (May
10, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2016/05/10/stories/1060036995 (noting
that leases covering approximately twenty percent of the original acres in the Chukchi
Sea remain).
113 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Department Cancels Arctic
Offshore Lease Sales (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interiordepartment-cancels-arctic-offshore-lease-sales.
114 See sources cited supra notes 104, 105.
115 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Al Gore Criticizes Obama on Climate Change and ‘Insane’
Arctic Drilling, GUARDIAN (July 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2015/jul/16/al-gore-obama-climate-change-arctic-drilling; Luke Whelan, Kayaktavists Take
Over Seattle’s Port to Protest Shell Oil’s Arctic Drilling Rig, MOTHER JONES (May 17, 2015),
http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2015/05/kayaktavistsv-take-over-seattles-elliottbay-protest-shell-oil-rig; William Yardley, Portland protesters hanging from bridge disrupt
Arctic-bound Shell vessel, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-nasej-shell-protest-20150730-story.html.
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impossible.116 Even beyond the risks of a spill, criticisms have focused
squarely on forward-looking environmental impacts. Some critics fear
the potential impacts on marine life.117 Others have expressed general
dismay at the expansion of fossil fuel production and its impact on the
climate.118
Indeed, responding to some of these recent concerns about
environmental impacts, in January 2015, President Obama withdrew
approximately 9.8 million acres in the waters of the Arctic from
commercial oil and gas development by Presidential memorandum,
largely in light of environmental concerns.119 And more recently, on
December 20, 2016, President Obama withdrew from commercial oil
and gas exploration the Chukchi Sea Planning Area and the Beaufort
Sea Planning Area (with certain exceptions) by Presidential
Memorandum pursuant to section 12(a) of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).120 He cited, in support of his decision,
concerns regarding environmental impacts.121 These actions, of
116 See Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 269, 270 (2011). See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL.,
RESPONDING TO OIL SPILLS IN THE U.S. ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT (2014). In 2012,
even the CEO of the French energy firm Total SA said there should be no drilling in
the Arctic, because the risk of spills was too high. Guy Chazan, Total Warns Against
Oil Drilling in Arctic, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/
350be724-070a-11e2-92ef-00144feabdc0.
117 See, e.g., Press Release, Earthjustice, Environmental Groups File Lawsuit
Challenging Shell Oil’s Risky and Reckless Arctic Drilling Plan (June 2, 2015),
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2015/environmental-groups-file-lawsuit-challengingshell-oil-s-risky-and-reckless-arctic-drilling-plan.
118 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, It’s Not Just the Spills: The Climate Risks of Arctic Drilling,
TIME (July 20, 2012), http://science.time.com/2012/07/20/its-not-just-spills-theclimate-risks-of-arctic-drilling (noting that Arctic drilling will likely release significant
greenhouse gases such as methane and black carbon) (citing CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,
BEST PRACTICES FOR REDUCTION OF METHANE AND BLACK CARBON FROM ARCTIC OIL AND
GAS PRODUCTION (July 2013)).
119 See Presidential Memorandum, Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States
Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 59 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/
27/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con;
Mike
Boots & Dan Utech, President Obama Protects Untouched Marine Wilderness in Alaska,
WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/
2015/01/27/president-obama-protects-untouched-marine-wilderness-alaska (citing 9.8
million figure).
120 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of the Interior
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidentialmemorandum-withdrawal-certain-portions-united-states-arctic.
121 See id.; sources cited supra note 119.
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course, have no impact on areas of the Arctic under global control and
outside the jurisdiction of the United States.122
The Arctic’s status is likely to remain contested and uncertain for
some time. Pressures have mounted to overturn the drilling
withdrawal in the U.S. Arctic waters. On April 28, 2017, President
Trump signed an Executive Order on Implementing an America-First
Offshore Energy Strategy.123 Section 5 of that Order purports to undo
President Obama’s 2016 withdrawal of Arctic leasing areas.124 This
move is consistent with industry advocacy to overturn or undo the
former withdrawal.125 Former military leaders in the United States
have likewise indicated their support for continued drilling in the
Arctic to promote national energy security.126 However, it is not likely
that legal authority exists for a President to reverse the withdrawal
under the current statute simply by executive order, as no such
delegation of the power to “undo” a withdrawal exists within the
statute’s terms.127 Perhaps recognizing this point, in April, 2017, two
Senators introduced a bill called the Offshore Production and
Energizing National Security Alaska Act of 2017, pursuant to which
the 2016 withdrawal by President Obama pursuant to Section 12(a) of
OCSLA would be deemed to have “no force or effect.”128
Environmental groups and scientists continue to oppose leasing land
for drilling — largely focusing on their forward-looking
environmental concerns.129 It remains to be seen what will come next.
B. Climate Change and Responsibility
We are all, in some respect or another, responsible for climate
change. There is not a person, corporation, organization, or nation
122

See infra Part V.B (discussing global governance).
Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
124 Id.
125 John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Trump Can Reverse Obama’s Last-Minute LandGrab, AEI.org (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.aei.org/publication/trump-can-reverseobamas-last-minute-land-grab/ (favoring acts to undo the withdrawal of lands).
126 STATEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SPECIALISTS ON THE
PROPOSED 2017–2022 OCS OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM (June 16, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/06/16/document_ew_02.pdf.
127 Keith Goldberg, Obama’s 11th-Hour Offshore Drilling Ban May Be Hard to Sink,
LAW360.COM (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/875398/obama-s11th-hour-offshore-drilling-ban-may-be-hard-to-sink.
128 OPENS Alaska Act of 2017, S. 883, 115th Cong. § 101 (as proposed to the
Senate, April 4, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s883/BILLS-115s883is.pdf.
129 Margaret Kriz Hobson, 440 Scientists to Obama: No New Leasing, ENERGYWIRE
(Jun 15, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060038818.
123
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that has not — in some capacity or another — contributed. Our aim,
however, unlike much work on the ethics of climate change, is not to
apportion responsibility.130 We will not attempt to say who bears what
share of the blame or what share of the remedial burdens going
forward. That is both a Herculean task and one that is not relevant to
our question. It is, however, worth noting that many of the investorowned and state actors who would potentially profit from Arctic
drilling have contributed significantly to the climate change that is
opening up the Arctic waters.
Undeniably, the oil industry has been a significant contributor to
global greenhouse gas emissions.131 Indeed, one recent study
concluded that “nearly two-thirds of historic carbon dioxide and
methane emissions can be attributed to 90 entities,” including both
investor- and state-owned oil and gas firms.132 The top twenty
investor- and state-owned entities contributing to global emissions
from 1751 to 2010, including such firms as Chevron, ExxonMobil,
Saudi Aramco, BP, Gazprom and Shell, contributed almost one third of
global emissions.133 Similarly, Northern nations and regions like the
United States, the European Union, and Russia have had an outsized
role in burning fossil fuels that have caused the climate to change.134
To say that corporations and nations have been major contributors
is not to make any ethical judgment. These greenhouse gas emissions
might be attributed equally to the consumers who created demand for
petroleum products (i.e., all of society).135 National emissions could
130

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
We mean that the oil industry’s upstream emissions through extraction and
refining, direct emissions, and downstream emissions resulting from the consumption
of fuel by consumers, have been significant.
132 Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to
Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854-2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229, 229-30, 238
(2014), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-013-0986-y.
133 Id. at 237 tbl.3.
134 Mengpi Ge, Johannes Friedrich & Thomas Damassa, 6 Graphs Explain the
World’s Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.
wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%E2%80%99s-top-10-emitters.
135 Again, for purposes of this Article, we are not concerned with overall allocation
of global responsibility to pay the costs of climate mitigation or adaptation. As a
matter of administrative ease, we recognize that placing responsibility “upstream” on
oil and gas producers can allow costs associated with such responsibility to be passed
downstream to others in society, including consumers. Many scholars therefore
advocate upstream carbon taxes or emissions trading to address carbon emissions
domestically. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap
and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37-44 (2009) (advocating an upstream carbon tax);
131
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just as easily be attributed to the consumers demanding and
purchasing products manufactured in other nations. And many
contributions occurred before the effects of burning fossil fuels were
known.136 The fact of contribution implies only a causal responsibility,
not necessarily an ethical responsibility.
There is one respect, however, in which some major actors do bear
at least some moral culpability. Many major energy firms took actions
that sought to obfuscate the effects of anthropogenic activity on the
climate.137 The Global Climate Coalition, in which many oil and gas
firms were members, actively lobbied against government regulation of
energy-related activities and greenhouse gas emissions, based on its
claims that the science was uncertain as to whether human activity
was contributing to climate change.138 Recently uncovered evidence
shows, however, that Exxon was internally aware of climate change as
early as 1991, although until recently the firm “publicly dismiss[ed
climate change models] as unreliable and based on uncertain
science.”139 More recently, a 1991 film produced by Shell, called
“Climate of Concern,” came to light, which had warned that climate

Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change,
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 344–53 (2008) (advocating an upstream carbon cap-andtrade system).
136 Daniel Farber, for example, has argued that, while most historical emissions of
greenhouse gasses were arguably innocent, once the United States entered into the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, claims of
innocence possess less moral weight; see Farber, Basic Compensation, supra note 10, at
1641-42. Frumhoff et al. have likewise argued that investor-owned fossil fuel
producers bear distinctive responsibilities for climate change in light of the significant
emissions that have occurred since the IPCC was established, and “leading scientists
had stated publicly that anthropogenic climate change was underway.” Frumhoff et
al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers, 132 CLIMATIC CHANGE
157, 158-59 (2015).
137 See Ingvild Andreassen Sæverud & Jon Birger Skjærseth, Oil Companies and
Climate Change: Inconsistencies between Strategy Formulation and Implementation?, 7
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 42, 43 (2007) (discussing oil companies’ strategic obfuscation of
anthropogenic nature of climate change).
138 Frumhoff et al., supra note 136, at 162-64 (discussing industry efforts to spread
“misleading claims about climate science”); see Lester R. Brown, The Rise and Fall of
the Global Climate Coalition, EARTH POL’Y INST. (July 25, 2000), http://www.earthpolicy.org/plan_b_updates/2000/alert6; see also Sæverud & Skjærseth, supra note 137,
at 49 (discussing Global Climate Coalition).
139 Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, What
Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/.
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change could lead to “extreme weather, floods, famines and climate
refugees as fossil fuel burning warmed the world.”140
Most relevant to Arctic drilling, Exxon’s models predicted,
accurately, that climate change would lengthen the open water season
in the Arctic. In 1992, a researcher at that firm stated publicly that a
longer open water season could reduce the costs of drilling in the
Arctic by “30% to 50%.”141 Thus, at the very least, this firm was aware
that continuing production and consumption of fossil fuels would
reduce its costs of future drilling in the Arctic — creating an
opportunity to benefit. If the early 1990s seems like relatively recent
history, it is worth noting that recent contributions to greenhouse gas
emissions have dwarfed historical emissions, with half of total carbon
and methane emissions from 1751 to 2010 having been emitted since
1984, and half of emissions “traced to carbon major fossil fuel and
cement production” having been emitted since 1986.142
What is important is to appreciate that past anthropogenic
contributions to climate change raise complex questions about the
nature of our ethical obligations moving forward. While past
contributions to climate change have not generally been criminal (like
murder), or unconstitutional (like a seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment), these contributions have unquestionably caused
significant harm to the planet. Historical contributions exist at various
points along a broad spectrum from the comparatively innocent to the
comparatively culpable. Thus, while it would be a mistake to say that
climate change is the result of past intentionally wrongful behavior
like murder, it would also be a mistake to say that the origins of
climate change have no ethical significance.
Having introduced the relevant facts regarding Arctic drilling and
responsibility for climate change, we now turn to the heart of the
analysis — using the case of Arctic drilling to determine the contours
and limits of the wrongful benefit principle.

140 Damian Carrington & Jelmer Mommers, ‘Shell Knew’: Oil Giant’s 1991 Film
Warned of Climate Change Danger, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 29, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/28/shell-knew-oil-giants-1991film-warned-climate-change-danger (contrasting Shell’s public film from 1991
“Climate of Concern” with its subsequent strategy of lobbying against climate
regulation).
141 Jerving et al., supra note 139.
142 Heede, supra note 132, at 234 (citations omitted).
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IV. THE WRONGFUL BENEFIT PRINCIPLE IN THE ARCTIC
In Part I, we offered a sketch of the wrongful benefit principle. But
that sketch left undefined the key elements of the principle. In this
Part, we unpack the elements of the wrongful benefit principle in its
four versions, using the case of Arctic drilling as our guide.
As we described, the wrongful benefit principle has different
dimensions, depending on what degree of culpability one requires in
the underlying act and depending on whether one takes a perpetratororiented or an object-oriented approach. In one sense or another,
every dimension of the wrongful benefit principle might be separately
applicable to Arctic drilling. Nation states and oil and gas firms have
arguably engaged in both culpable and non-culpable actions that have
contributed to climate change. And the wrongful benefit principle
potentially applies whether one focuses on these perpetrators or
simply on the Arctic oil as a morally tainted object. In this way, the
ethical concerns regarding the Arctic drilling are thoroughly overdetermined. But we consider the various dimensions sequentially,
both for clarity about the different ways that the wrongful benefit
principle can operate and to acknowledge that, as the dimensions
become more expansive, they depend on increasingly contentious
normative claims.
A. Applying the Wrongful Benefit Principle
1.

Culpable Perpetrators

The clearest form of wrongful benefit arises where a benefit derives
directly from a party’s own morally wrong past conduct. The
inheriting murderer receives a benefit that is the direct result of her
own morally culpable behavior. She profits from her own crime.143 We
suspect that few readers will disagree that such profiting is morally
problematic.
While this may be the easiest case to justify the wrongful benefit
principle, it may be more challenging to square this version of the
principle with the facts of Arctic drilling. One may object that those
who would drill in the Arctic — be it an investor-owned firm or a
nation-state — would do nothing morally similar to the murderer who

143 Note that it is not important whether subsequent profit was the intention
behind the wrongful act. It is wrong for the murderer to collect the inheritance,
whether the murder was part of a calculated scheme to inherit or the murder was
motived entirely by other animus and the inheritance was unanticipated.
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seeks to inherit. These entities would not be profiting from their own
past crimes.
Notice that this response is based upon a particular understanding
of the wrongful benefit principle. The imagined interlocutor accepts
the basic principle, but interprets both “bad act” and “sufficiently
connected” in relatively narrow ways. “Bad act” is understood to imply
morally blameworthy or even illegal conduct, like murder, and
“sufficiently connected” is understood to mean that the beneficiary
authored the bad act in question. In other words, wrongful benefit on
this view arises only insofar as one’s benefit would derive from one’s
own morally blameworthy or culpable conduct. While this
understanding reflects one form of the wrongful benefit principle, as
we argue below, this is not the only form that the principle may take.
Supposing that moral culpability were necessary for the wrongful
benefit principle to apply, there is an argument that the oil industry
has done something morally wrong that renders it responsible — at
least in part — for producing the benefits it now seeks to exploit.
Emissions have caused, and will continue to cause, harm to people
and the planet that otherwise would not have occurred but for past
extraction and refining of fossil fuels. The conduct causing these
emissions is not entirely innocent. Despite scientific understanding of
the anthropogenic nature of climate change, more than half of global
emissions have occurred since 1986.144 Even after the United States
entered into the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, and
the IPCC made clear that the extraction, refining, and consumption of
fossil fuels is affecting the climate, major oil and gas firms continued
with a business-as-usual approach and actively funded misinformation
campaigns.145 And at least one firm knew as far back as 1992 that
continuing fossil fuel production would decrease the costs of future
drilling in the Arctic.146 In this light, one could argue that this past
conduct cannot be viewed as entirely innocent.
One might object that, even if the oil industry has engaged in
morally culpable behavior that has contributed to climate change, the
causes of climate change are so diffuse that it is misleading to
characterize anyone as a “perpetrator.” Any single actor’s role in
producing climate change (or even the contributions of an entire
industry or nation) is far more attenuated than the murderer’s role in
producing the inheritance. The inheritance is directly attributable to

144
145
146

See Frumhoff et al., supra note 136, at 161; Heede, supra note 132, at 234.
See Frumhoff et al., supra note 136, at 163.
See Jerving et al., supra note 139.
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the murderer’s conduct, whereas the oil industry did not singlehandedly cause climate change. Along these lines, it might be pointed
out that, the murder is the but-for cause of the inheritance while it is
surely not true that climate change would not have happened but for
any particular actor’s emissions. At best, any given culpable actor has
been only a very small contributor to global emissions.147
We do not believe that this distinction is morally important to our
question. We are not interested in allocating responsibility or
determining what share of the culpability to assign to whom. Our
question is simply whether an actor’s past conduct is enmeshed in
creating an opportunity such that taking advantage of the opportunity
becomes inappropriate. The question is not whether an agent is the
perpetrator, but rather whether an agent has been a perpetrator.
To begin with, but-for causation is certainly not necessary for
culpability, as over-determination cases show.148 If a murderer shot
her relative at the same moment that another person also shot her
relative, then her actions would not be the “but-for” cause of her
inheritance. Yet it would be bizarre to think that this makes any
significant difference to the question of wrongful benefit. The mere
fact that there was another wrongdoer involved does not cleanse an
otherwise tainted inheritance.
More generally, wrongful benefit can arise when one’s actions are
only part of a broader systemic wrong. For example, imagine that
someone contributed to widespread online bullying of a peer. Suppose
that the peer commits suicide as a result of the bullying and,
surprisingly, leaves an inheritance to the person who participated in it.
We think that it would be wrong for this individual simply to accept
the money for personal use. It should either be refused altogether or
put toward some other cause. This is true regardless of how much of a
causal contribution the participation played in the suicide. It is
unnecessary to inquire how many others participated and how badly,
whether the bullying would have happened regardless, or whether the
victim even knew about this particular participant’s contributions.149
147 Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245
(1968) (noting that individuals have incentives to overuse public goods and perceive
their negative impact to be small); Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The
One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1388-90 (2011) (proposing that
climate change can only be solved through regulation of small contributions to global
emissions, but biases lead individuals to discount or ignore small values).
148 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 430 (2009) (“Counterfactual dependence is not and should
not be necessary in these cases.”).
149 An alternative example might be where someone has played a role in a system
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In short, the wrongful benefit principle may apply even where a
wrongdoer’s own contribution is small and impossible to distinguish
from the contributions of others.150
Fossil fuel producers (both investor-owned and state-owned) are in
a similar position with regard to global climate change. No individual
firm single-handedly caused global climate change. Nor was the oil
industry solely responsible. As noted above, one study recently
concluded that almost thirty percent of global carbon emissions from
1751 to 2010 could be attributed to the top twenty investor- and stateowned oil and gas firms, leaving more than two thirds of emissions
attributable to other sources.151 These firms did causally contribute to
an overall system that produced global climate change. Similarly, no
individual nation — let alone consumer — has caused climate change
on its own. But nations like the United States and Russia have clearly
played a non-trivial role in causing climate change. As with the merely
participating bully, one need not lay the fault squarely at any single
actor’s feet to say that there is something morally wrong with profiting
from one’s own culpable or causal misconduct.
2.

Non-Culpable, Causal Perpetrators

On this account, major nations and energy firms have engaged in
enough past culpable behavior to render it morally problematic for
them to profit from climate change opening up the Arctic waters. But
suppose that the reader disagrees, and remains unconvinced that their
past conduct was culpable. For the most part, the oil industry has
merely produced and sold fossil fuels and major nations have merely
consumed them. For a long time, we did not even appreciate that
these activities were harmful, and, even now that we do, that
appreciation does not make them categorically wrong — it certainly
does not make them comparable to murder. Why should anyone think
that the drilling in the Arctic would count as improperly profiting
of ethnic subjugation. Imagine, say, a German citizen who willingly assisted Nazi
officers in locating Jews. It would be a further wrong for that person to accept benefits
from this system, such as receiving confiscated Jewish property. It would not matter
whether the property in question came from the Jews against whom the person had
informed. But this example also highlights the non-perpetrator dimension of wrongful
benefit. It could be wrong for anyone, informer or not, to accept the stolen property.
150 One implication of this point with regard to climate change is that almost no
one is completely excused from responsibility. This may imply that we all — not just
the oil industry — have some perpetrator-oriented reasons to refrain from exploiting
the Arctic oil.
151 Heede, supra note 132, at 237 tbl.3; see also Frumhoff et al., supra note 136, at 158.
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from one’s past misconduct? If the corporations and nations in
question have done nothing culpable, then one might think that the
wrongful benefit principle would not apply.
The assumption behind this argument — that a perpetrator must
have engaged in a morally culpable bad act for the wrongful benefit
principle to apply — is probably too strong.152 Even if the past
contributions to global climate change were entirely innocent, we
believe that there are still perpetrator-oriented reasons to think that
the wrongful benefit principle would apply. Non-culpable
responsibility can suffice for application of the wrongful benefit
principle.
To see the point, consider an instance of non-culpable killing.153
Suppose that a person who has killed another in true self-defense is
then in position to profit from the killing. Perhaps the defensive killer
is declared the beneficiary of the deceased’s will.154 Or perhaps the
defensive killer might profit by selling his story or his weapon.155
Would there be anything wrong with this?
152 For a discussion of the perils in assuming that there is anything unjust about
liability without fault, see generally Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort
Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976).
153 As already noted, the slayer rules in various jurisdictions sometimes apply to
non-culpable killings, whether killers were not guilty by reason of insanity or
minority. See supra Part II.A.
154 The slayer rule does not apply in cases of self-defense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). For a criticism
of this position, see Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary
Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 622 (2009).
155 For our purposes, imagine someone who kills another in a paradigmatic,
unavoidable case of self-defense then profiting from having committed the killing by,
say, selling the gun. George Zimmerman is thus not the best example, given the
controversy surrounding his acquittal after killing Trayvon Martin. See, e.g.,
Zimmerman Found Not Guilty, Technically, But C’mon, ONION (July 15, 2013),
http://www.theonion.com/article/zimmerman-found-not-guilty-technically-but-cmon33124 (satirizing the outcome of the Zimmerman Trial). But Zimmerman does
provide an example of the possibility for profit, as he sought to auction the gun that
he used, claiming that he ultimately accepted a bid of $250,000 for the weapon. Karen
Brooks, George Zimmerman Gun Sells For $250,000, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2016,
9:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/george-zimmerman-gun-auction_us_
573fb7abe4b00e09e89f2834. The facts surrounding Zimmerman’s auction suggest that
others share our sense that profiting here would be wrong. A first attempt at
auctioning the gun failed after public outrage caused the auction site to remove the
auction and refuse to participate. See Frances Robles & Mike McPhate, George
Zimmerman Tries to Auction Gun Used to Kill Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/us/george-zimmerman-gun-auction-trayvonmartin.html. Even Zimmerman — who fiercely maintained his innocence — seems to
have viewed the proceeds as subject to special constraints, declaring that he would
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We think that there would. Even if one is not culpable, there are
constraints on how one can permissibly profit. It would be
inappropriate for the innocent killer to say simply, “Well, lucky for
me.” To profit in this way fails to express what Bernard Williams has
labeled “agent regret.”156 When an agent is the cause of harm, even
innocently, we expect him or her to manifest certain attitudes of regret
or remorse, and profiting is generally incompatible with these
attitudes. If even the innocent killer ought not profit, that suggests
that culpability is not a necessary condition for the wrongful benefit
principle to apply.
Lest one think that this point depends on something special about
killing, it is worth considering a more ordinary case. Suppose that a
toxic chemical leaks from a faulty holding tank at a chemical plant and
contaminates surrounding properties. Let us stipulate that the
chemical company is entirely cleared of any wrongdoing or liability,
the problem having been either entirely unforeseeable or attributable
to another party like the tank engineers. Suppose that the
contamination of the adjacent properties causes the state to condemn
them. The chemical company, which had hoped to expand but could
not previously afford the properties, then has the opportunity to
purchase the long-coveted lands incredibly cheaply at public auction.
In this scenario, we think that there would be something wrong with
scooping up the land as cheaply as possible and viewing it as merely a
fortuitous windfall. It matters that the company would be benefitting
from past harms that it played a role in causing. Even though the
company was not culpable for driving the surrounding residents out of
their homes, it may be subject to special obligations. Indicative of such
obligations, it would be perfectly intelligible if the public auction
demanded special concessions or if the company offered to pay an
above-auction price. Such responses are intelligible as a response to the
sense that benefitting here would be suspect. We do not mean to
suggest that any acquisition of the land would be impermissible; we
make only the weaker claim that some obligations arise. The general
point is that the wrongful benefit principle may be triggered even
without culpability. It is not only wrong to profit from one’s crimes; it
can also be wrong to profit from non-culpable acts or events.

donate them to conservative causes. See Christopher Brennan, George Zimmerman
Says that He Will Use $250G from His Gun Auction to Fund Conservative Causes, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 24, 2016, 7:49 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
george-zimmerman-netted-250-000-gun-auction-article-1.2647713.
156 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 27-30 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1981).
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Even if nations like the United States and oil and gas firms were not
morally culpable for contributing to climate change, there is little
doubt that they played a significant role in causing climate change.
Two-thirds of recent emissions are attributable to ninety investor- and
state-owned oil and gas firms.157 In short, the industry’s historical
practice of extraction and refining of fossil fuels was one of the most
significant causes of climate change. This production has as its mirror
image the consumption of oil-thirsty nations, to whom causal
responsibility can also be heavily attributed. Even if we did not
appreciate it at the time, we now know that this has been, and will
continue to be, incredibly harmful.
This historical role in causing global climate change — even if
entirely innocent — may make it wrong for these nations and firms to
profit from the damage that climate change has wrought. The causal
role in bringing about climate change is arguably enough to trigger the
wrongful benefit principle. Like the innocent chemical company, firms
and nations have contributed, however innocently, to altering other
people’s backyards adversely and now finds itself in a position to profit
as a result. This causal responsibility may be enough to trigger certain
obligations. These obligations may place constraints on whether these
parties may now profit or on how such profits might permissibly be
used. In saying this, we are not claiming that firms or nations should
be punished for innocent behavior, just as one need not think that a
defensive killer is culpable in order to think that he ought not reap a
six figure payday off his firearm. In both cases, culpability aside, some
special normative situation is created, which creates some obligations
going forward.
3.

Object-Oriented Obligations

Thus far, we have described perpetrator-oriented reasons for
thinking that the wrongful benefit principle applies to the oil industry
or historically high-emitting nations drilling in the Arctic.158 But is the
157

Heede, supra note 132, at 237 tbl.3.
Whether the fact that particular managers or shareholders who made the
decisions to extract fossil fuels in the past have died raises issues under the
nonidentity problem is beyond the scope of this Article. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS
AND PERSONS 351-78 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1984) (discussing the nonidentity
problem more generally); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS
4, 12 (1992) (describing the application of the nonidentity problem to rectifying
injustice). We note that under principles of corporate law, corporations have
“perpetual existence.” Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 764, 766 (2012).
158
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concern only based on the fact that a firm or nation is a past
contributor to climate change? One might wonder whether there
would be anything wrong with a new energy company — untarnished
by any history — drilling in the now-accessible regions of the Arctic
Ocean. Imagine, for example, that a newly formed company,
NewCorp, was the firm seeking to drill. We can even imagine that the
company has essentially no ties to the previous oil and gas industry or
the historical carbon emissions — perhaps it has been created by
Martians who had no role in past emissions on Earth. Would the
wrongful benefit principle still apply?
We believe that it would, though perhaps in a slightly different
form. In other words, the wrongful-benefit concerns about drilling in
the Arctic are not only about nations’ and corporations’ past history as
perpetrators. There is also something problematic about the act of
drilling for fossil fuels in areas accessible only due to the harm caused
by burning fossil fuels.159 This might be referred to the object-oriented
dimension of wrongful benefit.160 An object — be it your
grandmother’s china or a conflict diamond — can acquire special
ethical significance as a result of its history or how it was acquired. As
with the conflict diamond, such object-oriented significance can arise
out of a connection between the benefit received and some past bad
act, even if the recipient had nothing to do with the bad act.
Consider the following hypothetical — based on an example from
Daniel Butt161 — as an illustration of object-oriented remedial
obligations. You are a farmer in a small farming community on a
remote island. You all grow identical crops, which provide just enough
yield to live on. One year, however, one farmer surreptitiously
redirects the underground water flow from everyone else’s property
onto his own. Because your property abuts his property, extra water
flows onto your land. Come harvest time, you produce a massive
bumper crop, tripling your normal output, while all your neighbors’
fields are barren. Following Butt, we think that, in this situation, it
would be wrong for you to keep the excess crops. This obligation is
not based simply on your capacity to compensate your neighbors —
159 In contrast, imagine that an alternate universe existed in which humans had not
caused the climate to change, but, due to other circumstances, it became possible to
drill for oil in the Arctic. In that other universe, the object would not be tainted in the
same way, even if the environmental consequences of drilling for oil in the alternative
universe Arctic were the same as the consequences in our actual world.
160 See generally Goodin, supra note 15.
161 See Daniel Butt, On Benefiting from Injustice, 37 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 129, 132-33
(2007).
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the fact that you are now in possession of a surplus — but rather
based on the fact that this surplus derived from the wrongdoing of
your neighbor. That is, your excess crop yield is an object that comes
with ethical strings attached. You have done nothing wrong — you are
not a perpetrator in any sense — but the wrongful benefit principle
nonetheless applies to you.
In his telling, Butt includes another party who works harder than
you and achieves a crop surplus — though he is unaffected by the
redistribution of the water. Despite having an even greater capacity to
compensate based on his hard work, this party plausibly has less duty
to do so than the party who benefitted from the wrongdoing. It is
important to distinguish our claims from those based upon principles
of distributive justice. Even the poor farmer who is the beneficiary of
past wrongful conduct may have an obligation to disgorge some of the
profit, or not to profit in the first place. Distributional concerns, such
as whether the distribution of resources was just in the first instance,
must be addressed through different mechanisms.162
This version of the wrongful benefit principle — based on culpable
conduct by others and a tainted object — applies to the case of Arctic
drilling quite readily. Even if the firm seeking to drill in the Arctic
were NewCorp, there would be a good argument that it would have an
obligation not to profit from the past culpable acts of others. The
opportunity to drill, like the bumper crop, is the direct result of past
harmful acts. To avail oneself of this benefit is to profit from a past
wrong, even if one is innocent oneself.163
One might object that there is a morally relevant difference between
Arctic drilling and the bumper crop in the above example. Unlike the
bumper crop, the opportunity to drill in the Arctic — the benefit
received — is not the same object that was wrongfully “taken” if
anything was “taken” at all. In the farming example, the benefit
received is essentially the object that was wrongfully taken. The excess
water that you receive is basically a stolen good, wrongfully taken
from your neighbors at the expense of their ability to water their own
crops. Relinquishing the crops you derive from the water seems akin
to relinquishing the stolen water itself. Global climate change, in
162

See infra Part IV.B.
For a discussion of what duties one might owe particular victims as a result of
others’ past culpable conduct, see generally Robert E. Goodin & Christian Barry,
Benefiting from the Wrongdoing of Others, 31 J. APPLIED PHIL. 363 (2014) (discussing
“who owes what to whom” when an innocent party is a beneficiary of past
wrongdoing, such as the father’s payment of a bribe to a Harvard admissions officer to
admit his child).
163
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contrast, has not stolen from anyone the opportunity to drill in the
Arctic waters. So the connection between the wrongful harm and the
benefit received appears more tenuous.
This objection raises a serious question about the expansiveness of
the object-oriented versions of the wrongful benefit principle. It
cannot be the case, one might say, that any benefit that results from
another’s past wrongful act is, as a result, necessarily a tainted object
or tainted good. For example, Truman Capote wrote In Cold Blood
based on the murders committed by Dick Hickock and Perry Smith.
Capote benefitted significantly — to the tune of $2 million in the first
year164 — and this benefit derived from the heinous crime that
Hickock and Smith committed.165 If the wrongful benefit principle
would condemn the opportunity to profit from Capote’s book, it runs
the risk of becoming overinclusive.166 Every gain traceable back to
some human misfeasance — from the short seller who profits after
financial fraud167 to the incidental workplace beneficiary of a wrongful
termination168 — might become morally questionable. Examples like
these suggest that not every benefit that conceivably derives from a
wrong is necessarily impermissible; not all benefits from wrongdoing
are tainted. So how can we say that drilling in the Arctic is like the
bumper crop rather than like In Cold Blood?
Determining the limits of what counts as a tainted good is a difficult,
philosophically rich puzzle. Surely the correct answer will depend, in
part, on the normative foundation of the wrongful benefit principle, an
164 Harry Gilroy, A Book in a New Form Earns $2-Million for Truman Capote, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 1965), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/12/28/home/capote-million.html.
165 One might object that, had Hickock and Smith not committed the murders,
Capote would simply have written about some other true crime and that his success
came from inventing a new genre, not from the crime itself. While this may be largely
correct, it remains hard to argue that Capote did not, in fact, benefit from Hickock
and Smith committing the crime that they did.
166 But see RALPH F. VOSS, TRUMAN CAPOTE AND THE LEGACY OF IN COLD BLOOD, 192216 (2011) (discussing whether Capote was guilty of exploiting the Kansas
community where the crimes took place).
167 See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
168 In a classic Seinfeld episode, George cruelly tells a restaurant manager that a
busboy caused a fire at the neighboring table and Elaine jokingly adds that she will
never eat there again. See Seinfeld: The Busboy, Season 2, Episode 12 (NBC television
broadcast June 26, 1991). The busboy is fired. As it turns out, however, the next day
there is a fire in the restaurant killing the wait-staff — the busboy was saved only by
being fired the day before. Arguably, the busboy benefitted from George’s immoral
conduct. In fact, much of the episode’s humor comes as the busboy thanks George for
saving his life. Surely, one might say, the busboy should not regard his fortunate
escape as morally tainted because it stemmed from arguably wrongful conduct.
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issue we address below. But, for present purposes, there are two
features of Arctic drilling that we believe make Arctic resources tainted
goods. First, the opportunity to drill is the reciprocal of the
environmental harms of climate change insofar as both are matters of
the same changed climate conditions. Second, drilling in the Arctic
will produce more of the same harm from which it derives, reflecting a
morally problematic indifference to the initial harm.
To explain the first of these responses in greater detail, the
suggested disanalogy between Arctic drilling and the bumper crop was
that the bumper crop recipient gets the precise thing that the victims
lose, namely water. According to this view, the oil industry, in
contrast, is not getting the precise thing that victims of climate change
are losing. We disagree. This view derives from an overly reified
conception of the benefits and losses. In fact, the oil industry is getting
more favorable global climate conditions, which are the precise inverse
of what climate victims are getting, namely less favorable conditions.
To see the point, consider a modified version of Butt’s farming
example. Again imagine that you are part of an isolated island farming
community. This time, imagine that, for no particular reason, you
grow tomatillos on your land, but the other farmers around you grow
blueberries. With moderate effort every year, you each generate just
enough of your respective crops to cover your living expenses. One
year, after the crops have been planted, one of the other farmers
intentionally uses an illegal chemical fertilizer, hoping to boost his
yield illicitly. The fertilizer contaminates the entire community,
significantly altering the pH balance of the soil to make it more
alkaline. The blueberries, which require acidic soil, are completely
wiped out. But your tomatillos, which thrive in alkaline conditions,
produce a bumper crop of triple their normal output. Do you have any
remedial obligations?
It seems to us that there is no moral difference between this case
and the original case where water is diverted. In both, you receive a
bumper crop due entirely to the malfeasance of another, which has
harmed others within the community. Though the first involved
receipt of a physical substance (water) and the second involved receipt
of a condition (alkalinity), that difference cannot be normatively
significant. But the receipt of changed conditions — beneficial to some
but harmful to many others — is precisely the situation of the global
community with regard to climate change. The investor- or stateowned oil firms, in availing themselves of unfrozen Arctic waters,
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would be benefitting from the warmer planet that threatens billions of
people and even more non-human animals worldwide.169
Even if this were not enough, there is a second reason why Arctic
drilling should be regarded as a tainted object in a way that In Cold
Blood is not. The reason is that Arctic drilling will impose the same
harm that has brought about its possibility. One might think that an
important feature of In Cold Blood is that it is a literary masterpiece. It
was an overall good for society that Capote penned it. In general,
however, we do not think there is a moral requirement that one’s
actions be overall beneficial to society.170 There is nothing necessarily
morally wrong about writing a terrible or artistically meritless book, a
book that has more harmful consequences than good ones, or even a
book that inspires readers to commit murder (lest we condemn Catcher
in the Rye).171 Still, there is something valuable in the intuition here.
Imagine that Capote had written a book that compounded the harm
that he was capitalizing on. Suppose, for example, that instead of
writing In Cold Blood, Capote had penned the equally profitable How
to Commit Murder in Cold Blood, again based on what he gathered from
the real-life murders of Hickock and Smith. Now, we contend, there
would be something wrong about profiting in this way. The wrong is
based neither on writing a book based on real-life murders nor on
writing a book that causes harm, but it is based on the confluence of
these two factors. Writing such a book would manifest indifference to
the real murders. It would treat them as opportune and replicable

169 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (providing an overview of
current knowledge of the science of climate change); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_
spm_en.pdf (discussing threats and potential impacts of climate change on humans,
animals, and the environment).
170 In saying this, we are rejecting robust act utilitarianism — the view that one is
morally required to maximize the good consequences of every action — but such a view
has such radical consequences that this hardly seems like a significant position to take.
171 See STALKING, THREATENING, AND ATTACKING PUBLIC FIGURES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 22 (J. Reid Meloy, Lorrain Sheridan & Jens Hoffmann eds.,
2008) (“[T]he most striking example [of the influence of literature is] the intense
interest in, and identification with, Holden Caulfield, the angst-ridden adolescent in
the book, Catcher in the Rye . . . . Mark Chapman was 25 years old when he killed
John Lennon in December, 1980, and then sat down on the curb and was reading the
book when the police arrived. Three months later, John Hinckley Jr., was 25 when he
attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. The book was found in his hotel
room. Robert Bardo was 19 when he killed Rebecca Schaeffer 8 years later. He had the
book in his possession at the time.”).
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models rather than as something to be condemned.172 Thus, profit that
might not be per se wrongful — here, profit from writing a deleterious
book — can become wrongful when it arises in a historical context
that ought to be met with condemnation rather than opportunism. In
other words, an object may become tainted when profiting from it
would reflect insensitivity rather than condemnation in the face of a
regrettable reality.
The same is true, we believe, of Arctic drilling in the face of climate
change. Drilling in Arctic regions that are only accessible due to the
burning of fossil fuels involves taking advantage of the past harms. It
fails to register the disapprobation that is appropriate for the
environmental damage that continues to be wrought. By simply treating
the melting Arctic as an opportunity to produce more fossil fuels, Arctic
drilling reflects a willful indifference to the harms of climate change. It
is one thing to cause the ordinary harms of fossil fuel production; it is
another to respond to the collective harms of fossil fuel production by
treating them as an opportunity for more such harms. This, we believe,
can trigger the wrongful benefit principle. In contrast, In Cold Blood is
not connected in this way; it does not treat the victims as an
opportunity for more of the same kind of harm.
4.

Objects Stemming from Others’ Past Innocent Conduct and
Moral Ills

Many of the object-oriented forms of wrongful benefit that we have
discussed thus far involve goods that are tainted by truly culpable acts
like murder or theft. One might argue, at this point, that climate
change is unlike this. Climate change, the thought goes, is not some
abhorrent act that needs to be condemned as immoral, but rather an
unfortunate conundrum that we have gotten ourselves into, with no
one to blame. This is what Holly Lawford-Smith has referred to as a
“moral ill”: “The world has not gone as it ought, morally, to have
gone.”173 No identifiable party is culpable and there is no incremental
improvement that any party could make.174 There is no wrongdoing or
injustice, but there has been a failure.
It is questionable whether climate change is actually like this —
innumerable people to blame should not be confused with no one to
172 See Butt, supra note 161, at 143 (arguing that obligations of beneficiaries arise
out of the duty to condemn injustice).
173 Holly Lawford-Smith, Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change, 31 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 392, 395 (2014).
174 Id.
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blame. But, even if it is, we believe that the wrongful benefit principle
may still apply. Consider yet a final variation of the farming example.
Suppose that the pH balance in the soil is not altered by one
individual’s illegal use of fertilizer, but rather by the collective toll of
the community’s farming practices, including your own.175 Assume
that no single individual is to blame, nor would any single individual’s
action have made any difference. Nonetheless, you now have a bumper
crop of tomatillos and everyone else has lost their blueberries. We
believe that, again, you would have some remedial obligations not
simply to pocket this surplus. Though no one has done anything
culpable, the world has not gone as it ought to have gone, and you
should not benefit because of this deviation.176
Even if no one were at all culpable for anthropogenic climate
change, it would have this same character. We have, collectively, failed
to ensure that the world go as it ought. Many individuals will be
harmed by this change, but some will benefit directly from it. It is
incumbent upon those who do reap the benefits to view them as, in a
nonculpable sense, wrongfully obtained. This may entail obligations to
forgo or surrender some of the benefits.
In this final sense, then, Arctic drilling may be subject to the
wrongful benefit principle. Even if we assume that no one is
blameworthy for climate change, there is something morally suspect
about investor- or state-owned oil and gas firms, or nations reaping
profits from a human failure that has inflicted grave and still unfolding
harm on millions, if not billions, of innocent people.177 This is an
175 This example shares features of nonpoint source water pollution such as
agricultural runoff into the Gulf of Mexico.
176 Cf. Lawford-Smith, supra note 173, at 399-400 (“If there is at least one person
who suffers as a result of the world going other than it morally ought to have gone
who can be compensated or made reparation, then to that extent it is impermissible to
retain any benefits necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have gone.”).
177 See DARA, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR (2d ed. 2012), http://www.daraint.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CVM2-Low.pdf (estimating that climate change and
a carbon-intensive economy will cause 100 million deaths by 2030); see also Farber,
Basic Compensation, supra note 10, at 1610-13 (cataloguing the victims of climate
change). In discussing the application of wrongful benefit to moral ills, Lawford-Smith
adopts a “victim-driven” principle. That is, she suggests that benefitting may only be
wrong if there is a victim to whom the benefits might be transferred. Lawford-Smith,
supra note 173, at 399. It is abundantly evident that there are many victims of climate
change, so her rationale applies. But we believe that there might be reasons to apply
the wrongful benefit principle even in the absence of human victims. First, as the
discussion of permissible harms above showed, some benefits may be all-thingsconsidered harmful to the world, including non-human species and the environment
itself. In such cases, forgoing the benefit would serve a purpose, even in the absence of
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object-oriented perspective, not focused on any single firm or nation
as a perpetrator, and it assumes no culpability of any actor.
Admittedly, this is the broadest conception of wrongful benefit and
one that not everyone will readily endorse. But it highlights the fact
that the different versions of the wrongful benefit principle apply to
Arctic drilling in a wide range of ways, even if one ignores any single
firm’s or nation’s role as a significant and culpable contributor.
B. The Normative Foundations of the Wrongful Benefit Principle
By drawing out various analogies and moral intuitions, we have
suggested that the wrongful benefit principle applies to drilling in the
Arctic. It applies because those who would drill have been
perpetrators in changing the climate, and it applies because the newly
accessible regions of the Arctic should be regarded as objects that are
tainted by the moral stain of anthropogenic climate change. One may
view the application of the principle to be more or less expansive, but
we hope to have suggested that even the most conservative
interpretation will still raise considerations in the Arctic context.
Even if one accepts the argument thus far, it may appear
theoretically unsatisfying. We have extracted a principle — perhaps
plausible in its own right — but with little explanation of its
theoretical underpinnings. Even if they do exist, where do these
obligations not to profit come from? And what are their limits?
In order to answer these questions, consider first the nature of the
obligations imposed by the wrongful benefit principle. The obligations
described by the wrongful benefit principle are correlates of remedial or
rectificatory obligations.178 A central premise of corrective justice is that,
in response to injustice, parties may acquire obligations to rectify the
injustice.179 For example, a thief acquires an obligation to return the
stolen property. Often remedial obligations have this form, calling for
the relinquishment of wrongfully obtained gains. The wrongful benefit
any victim to compensate. Second, for those who are motivated by a deterrence-based
rationale, forgoing benefits may be viewed as a form of self-policing, where abstaining
from the benefit deters future wrongdoing. See infra Part IV.B; cf. Aaron Ridley, IllGotten Gains: On the Use of Results from Unethical Experiments in Medicine, 9 PUB. AFF.
Q. 253, 261-62 (1995).
178 See Butt, supra note 161, at 130-31.
179 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 427, 429-30 (1992); Jules Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective
Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 352-54 (1992); Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403, 403-04 (1992) (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-23 (Martin
Ostwald trans., 1962)).

1892

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1845

principle applies similar logic when the gains have yet to be realized.
Rather than saying that the wrongfully obtained gains must be
relinquished, however, the wrongful benefit principle says that they
should not be acquired in the first place. Ultimately, the same rationale
is at work, whether we say that the murderer has an obligation to
relinquish her inheritance or has an obligation not to inherit.
As the invocation of corrective justice implies, the law is deeply
concerned with perpetrator-oriented remedial obligations. The law
also recognizes object-oriented remedial obligations in a number of
ways. Good faith purchasers of stolen goods are generally required to
return them to their original owners.180 Unjust enrichment may
require even innocent recipients of benefits, such as accidental or
misdirected payments, to restore them to their rightful owners.181
More recently, financial clawback suits and clawback legislation have
become a tool for ensuring that parties do not profit, even nonculpably, from unfair financial transactions.182
Legal and ethical theorists have suggested a range of justifications
for object-oriented remedial obligations from those incorporating
expressive concerns to those incorporating consequentialist concerns
with incentives. For example, Daniel Butt argues that refusing to
accept benefits is a necessary aspect of the duty to condemn
injustice.183 In contrast, Aaron Ridley contends that availing oneself of
the benefits of wrongdoing would encourage other acts of
wrongdoing.184 Quite differently, Robert Goodin argues that objectoriented responses to wrongdoing may offer informational efficiencies
over other possible responses.185 Finally, Axel Gosseries traces the
object-oriented duties of beneficiaries to the duty not to free ride.186
180

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.F.
182 See generally Amy Sepinwall, Righting Others’ Wrongs: A Critical Analysis of
Clawbacks in Madoff-type Ponzi Schemes and Other Frauds, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(discussing the ethical challenges of using clawback suits to recoup gains from
innocent investors who profited from Ponzi schemes, and arguing for the broader
application of clawbacks and restitution).
183 See Butt, supra note 161, at 143 (“[T]aking our nature as moral agents seriously
requires not only that we be willing not to commit acts of injustice ourselves, but that
we hold a genuine aversion to injustice and its lasting effects. We make a conceptual
error if we condemn a given action as unjust, but are not willing to reverse or mitigate
its effects on the grounds that it has benefitted us. The refusal undermines the
condemnation.”).
184 See Ridley, supra note 177, at 261.
185 See Goodin, supra note 15, at 479.
186 See Axel Gosseries, Historical Emissions and Free-Riding, 11 ETHICAL PERSP. 36,
51-52 (2004).
181
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Each of these justifications could plausibly apply to drilling in the
Arctic. For example, climate change has such a massive range of
responsible agents — essentially everyone on earth to some extent or
another — meaning that fault-based responses involve overwhelming
information costs. A more effective response may be object-oriented,
targeting the beneficiaries of climate change.187 Climate change is
indisputably going to impose massive societal costs. To reap the
profits from it while letting others shoulder its costs looks like a form
of free riding.
One might be tempted to link these cases together through the lens
of incentives and deterrence. On this view, the purpose of the
wrongful benefit principle and the legal doctrines we have discussed
as falling within its ambit are all about providing incentives to avoid
bad acts. The exclusionary rule tells federal and state agents not to
violate the Constitution in their searches, or they will be unable to use
the evidence to support conviction. Slayer statutes deter murders by
removing the incentives that might shape a killer’s motive. But while
this might be a compelling rationale for perpetrator-oriented culpable
acts like murder, or even some object-oriented considerations such as
the desire to deter rebel warfare in diamond mining, a deterrence
rationale cannot fully explain the wrongful benefit principle in all of
its forms. Deterrence has no role to play in cases of non-culpable but
causal actions that create opportunities for profit. The wrongful
benefit principle has no impact on the insane person who kills and
stands to inherent — who cannot legally “intend” such an act. Nor can
the wrongful benefit principle deter natural disasters like hurricanes,
though we argue that the principle still applies to prevent pricegouging. In such cases, deterrence has no impact. Similarly, while
recognizing some intuitive appeal to viewing the principle through the
lens of distributive justice, we do not believe that such an account
captures all of its nuances. Whether a beneficiary of past wrongful
conduct is rich or poor is not normatively significant to whether an
ethical obligation arises to forego the benefit. Distributional concerns
can be addressed through other mechanisms.188
187 This is part of the motivation behind the so-called “beneficiary pays principle,”
which would allocate costs of mitigating climate change on the basis of present benefit
rather than past contributions to pollution. See Edward A. Page, Give it Up For Climate
Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle, 4 INT’L THEORY 300, 306 (2012).
The wrongful benefit principle is quite different, and we do not mean to be endorsing
the beneficiary pays principle. We are not concerned here with who must pay the
costs of climate mitigation and adaptation.
188 See supra Section IV.A.3.
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Ultimately, we believe that the wrongful benefit principle is founded
upon the duty of respect. What is wrong with benefitting from
wrongdoing is that it fails to respect those who have suffered from the
wrongdoing.189 As we noted earlier about writing a profitable book
based on a series of real murders, the action seems wrong insofar as it
would manifest indifference to the real murders. The wrong consists
in failing to respect the fact that real people were murdered.
This explanation may seem to treat the duties of wrongful benefit as
expressive. They appear to be forms of our general duty to condemn
injustice. In one sense, we accept this characterization. Continued
drilling in the Arctic seems wrong — at least in part — for expressive
reasons. It manifests a refusal to condemn climate change, and instead
an embrace of it. Viewing global climate change as merely a business
opportunity fails to acknowledge its ethically loaded character, and it
may even encourage the destructive dependence on fossil fuels that has
produced the problem.190 And these kinds of considerations are part of
what would make drilling in the Arctic an instance of wrongful benefit.
Still, characterizing the obligations against wrongful benefit as
expressive can be misleading. It might suggest that the duty is about
communicating some content (e.g. that what happened was wrong) to
some recipient. If this were the case, then it would raise two classic
issues faced by expressive theories in other contexts. First, why can’t
the expression be accomplished in other, less costly ways?191 And,
second, would the duty still apply if the expressive content were going

189 Our focus on respect for those who have been harmed or wronged — victims,
so to speak — takes no stand on who or what might fall within this class. Depending
on one’s views, it might include nonhuman animals or other entities like a
community, an ecosystem, or even the earth itself. For example, one might think that
there is something wrong with wearing the ermine coat that you inherited from your
grandmother because it seems to manifest a lack of respect for the creatures that were
killed to create it. Your action won’t create positive incentives — the animals are long
dead — but it still might seem disrespectful to cloak oneself in their skins. Or one
might think that drilling in the Arctic would manifest a failure to respect the harm
that we have wrought on the earth itself. But if one is inclined toward a more
anthropocentric moral view, then one can focus only on the human victims of climate
change.
190 See Jerving et al., supra note 139 (discussing Exxon’s research demonstrating
that continuing fossil fuel burning would reduce the cost of drilling in the Arctic by
thirty to fifty percent).
191 As T.M. Scanlon evocatively puts it, “Insofar as expression is our aim, we could
just as well ‘say it with flowers’ or, perhaps more appropriately, with weeds.” T.M.
Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, 8 TANNER LECTURES ON HUM. VALUES 149, 214
(1986).
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to be masked or unreceived?192 For example, suppose that our
inheriting murderer could condemn her crime through a public
statement or could be certain that her receipt of the inheritance would
go unnoticed. Would either of these facts make receiving the benefit
any less bad? We think not. For this reason, we believe that the better
characterization of the duties in question is in terms of manifesting
respect. Whether one manifests respect is independent of recipient
observation.193 It would be disrespectful, for example, to use your
deceased mother’s portrait as kindling even if one were alone or if one
vocally exclaimed one’s enduring love for her.
What disrespect is manifested by wrongfully benefitting? We believe
that it is a disrespect for those who were previously victimized by the
bad conduct, and for the environment itself — not merely its human
inhabitants. For example, when the murderer inherits from her victim,
it manifests a new and further disrespect for the victim, who becomes
merely an instrument for the murderer’s own ends. When an
American couple purchases a conflict diamond for their engagement,
it manifests a lack of respect for the fact that Africans were brutally
exploited in its acquisition. Similarly, if an investor- or state-owned
firm or the United States itself treats the Arctic oil as just another
opportunity to achieve profit or even something like energy security, it
manifests a lack of respect for the fact that climate change has harmed
current human and non-human victims, in addition to victims in
future generations.
Described in this way, the wrongful benefit principle connects
naturally with the broader ethical concept of exploitation. Consider
the following characterization of exploitation from Ruth Sample:
The basic idea is that exploitation involves interacting with
another being for the sake of advantage in a way that degrades
or fails to respect the inherent value in that being. It is this
lack of respect that explains the badness of exploitation . . .
[W]e can fail to respect a person by taking advantage of an
injustice done to him. . . . If we gain advantage from an
interaction with another, and that advantage is due in part to
an injustice he has suffered, we have failed to give him
appropriate respect . . . Those who make use of such weaker
192 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in THE RETRIBUTIVE IDEA 111, 131
(1988) (arguing that we should still mete out punishment for expressive reasons even
if the message will go unheard).
193 See
JOSEPH RAZ, VALUE, RESPECT, AND ATTACHMENT 151-53 (2001)
(characterizing respect in terms of a particular way of responding to value).
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bargaining positions for the sake of advantage are failing to
demonstrate the appropriate respect that is due to the victims
of injustice.194
For Sample, one way that a party may exploit another is to fail to
respect their status as a victim and to take advantage of their situation
of less leverage or bargaining power.
Now, wrongfully benefitting does not exactly involve taking
advantage of a person in the way that Sample is explicating. But it does
involve taking advantage of a situation. It is no coincidence that cases
of wrongful benefit may also be described in terms of exploitation. The
inheriting murderer is trying to exploit his relative’s death.195 If Capote
did anything wrong, it was because he exploited the horrific Kansas
murders.196 And continued drilling in the Arctic would arguably be
exploiting climate change.
Of course, not all things that can be described as “exploiting” are
morally problematic. Peyton Manning exploits an opponent’s weak
secondary; Fallingwater exploits the beauty of its natural setting.
There are some things that it is permissible to take advantage of —
either because doing so is not disrespectful or because there is no duty
of respect that is owed. But human tragedy, environmental
degradation, and significant wrongs are not among these things. When
a party benefits wrongfully, she takes advantage of a wrongful
situation in a way that fails to acknowledge that some persons (and
non-humans) are now victims. In the case of climate change — among
the most significant tragedies and wrongs — these victims are mainly
persons in the developing world or future generations. They deserve
our respect and something more than crassly profiting from what has
been or will be done to them. Such consideration, at least, should
figure into the reasons concerning whether one ought to drill.
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We could choose to end our analysis here. We have articulated a
normative principle, gleaned lessons about its features from both
194

RUTH J. SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT’S WRONG 57, 74 (2003).
Highlighting the connection, a number of states have now included within their
slayer statutes provisions to prevent anyone who has financially exploited the
decedent from inheriting. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.84.010–020 (2016)
(including “abuser,” which is defined as “any person who participates . . . in the
willful and unlawful financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult,” alongside “slayer” in
the state’s slayer statute).
196 And some people did accuse him of this. See VOSS, supra note 166, at 211.
195
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ethics and law, applied it to our case study, and addressed its
foundations and limits. However, we believe that one important task
remains: to consider how these theoretical principles might inform
actual law or policy. Therefore, in this final Part, we make three
concrete policy recommendations that would incorporate the
wrongful benefit principle in practice and consider how these
recommendations might be realized in present legal structures. We
recognize that this final Part represents a shift in tone — from a
discussion of abstract principles to the concrete world of policy in
action. We make this choice consciously. Our aim is to demonstrate
that the wrongful benefit principle is not merely theory, but can have
practical bearing on a complex and contemporary real-world problem
of global import.
A. Three Policies
While current discussions about how to govern Arctic waters are
largely viewed in terms of cost-benefit analysis or international
realpolitik, we contend that normative considerations like the
wrongful benefit principle deserve a place in the discussion as well.
We do not mean to claim, however, that considerations of wrongful
benefit are the only ones at play. The norm against wrongful benefit
must be weighed alongside many other competing considerations,
including pragmatic concerns about environmental, economic, and
other consequences. So what would this look like?
In Part II, we examined a range of legal doctrines, all of which
appear to incorporate the wrongful benefit principle in some fashion.
Each offers some concrete legal remedy or response, ranging from
direct prohibitions on slayer inheritance or price-gouging, to the
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence from trial, to
informational governance regimes like the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (“Kimberley Process”). If one takes seriously the
application of the wrongful benefit principle to the Arctic, what sort of
legal response might be appropriate? We offer three policies — in
descending order of ambition — through which our global and
domestic legal and customary institutions governing the Arctic might
incorporate the principle.
First, we propose a global moratorium on drilling in regions of the
Arctic that have only become accessible as a result of climate change.
If, as we have argued, the benefits to be reaped and the actors who
would reap them both raise significant ethical concerns, then a
moratorium would seem a logical response. A moratorium would
effectuate the meaning of the wrongful benefit principle in practice, as
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it would not only preclude those actors that in the past contributed to
climate change from drilling; it would likewise preclude others from
benefitting from the tainted goods that lie therein. Moreover, many
people are already calling for a ban or moratorium on Arctic drilling
out of concern for harms to the environment, to marine life, or to the
climate in the future.197 There is, of course, a partial withdrawal of
areas from leasing currently in place on the United States Outer
Continental Shelf as a result of Presidential action under the prior
administration. That action is consistent with the wrongful benefit
principle, even if it was not adopted with the principle in mind.198 To
the extent that debate continues over the withdrawal of areas from
leasing, either as a result of President Trump’s Executive Order on
Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy or an effort at
Congressional action, the wrongful benefit principle provides an
additional principled reason for supporting the existing withdrawal.
But, regardless, such action should not be limited to the United States.
Short of a global moratorium, we still envision two ways that the
wrongful benefit principle can affect Arctic policy. Our argument, after
all, is that wrongful benefit generates concerns that should be weighed
when considering whether, and in what ways, to permit Arctic drilling
under the relevant legal and customary regimes. With that in mind, we
propose two concrete ways that the law could take such
considerations into account.

197 For example, in May, 2016, sixty-eight members of Congress co-signed a letter
to the Secretary of Interior calling for a revision of leasing plans to ensure that “the
Arctic Ocean should be permanently protected from oil drilling, not used to drill for
more fossil fuels that we will not need — and must not burn — if we are serious about
powering our future with clean energy.” Press Release, Rep. Jared Huffman, Rep.
Huffman Leads Bipartisan Letter Urging DOI to End Dangerous Oil & Gas Drilling in
the Arctic (May 2, 2016), https://huffman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rephuffman-leads-bipartisan-letter-urging-doi-to-end-dangerous-oil-gas.
198 We note, parenthetically, that a ban on mining for mineral resources was
adopted under Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty, June 22, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (“Any activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited.”); see also S.K.N. Blay,
New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The 1991 Madrid Protocol, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 377, 395 (1992) (discussing the mining ban). In 2016, on the twentyfifth anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, the Consultative Parties met
and reaffirmed this commitment to “prohibit any activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientific research.” CONSULTATIVE PARTIES TO THE ANTARCTIC
TREATY, SANTIAGO DECLARATION ON THE TWENTY FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF
THE PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, at 2 (May
30, 2016), http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM39/ad/atcm39_ad003_e.pdf. Therefore,
global cooperation at this level is possible.
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Our second recommendation is a system of global cooperation
modeled on the Kimberley Process that would require a chain-ofcustody certification that fossil fuels do not come from Arctic waters.
Such an informational governance regime would put potential
beneficiaries and the public on notice of the tainted nature of Arctic
fossil fuels, just as the Kimberley Process does for conflict
diamonds.199 Informational governance tends to be less expensive and
less controversial than other forms of governance, such as prescriptive
rules or bans, but the provision of information can affect both public
and private decision making.200 It can educate firm managers about
not only their environmental impacts but also their ethical obligations,
and can inform consumers that there may be ethical distinctions of
which they were not previously aware — for example, the distinction
between Arctic and other fossil fuels. We acknowledge that
informational governance does not guarantee outcomes as a
prescriptive rule or ban might and opens the door to potential
manipulation.201 But, we believe that these concerns can be overcome
through careful institutional design. A well designed informational
regime would be a way to show that these considerations matter, even
if they are not categorically determinative.
Third, without imposing any new governance structures, we
propose reinterpreting existing statutory cost-benefit analysis in a
more capacious way, so that it incorporates considerations like those
in the wrongful benefit principle. Cost-benefit analysis can, especially
in environmental law, risk devolving into a purely forward-looking
consequentialist calculus. It has at times been reasonably criticized for
smuggling in controversial assumptions about value.202 But costbenefit analysis can also be a much more innocent directive to

199 Cf. Kysar, supra note 71, at 615-623 (favoring information disclosure to inform
consumers about the processes by which goods have been produced); Sarah E. Light,
NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L.
REV. 511, 519-25 (2013) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of informational
governance in the climate context).
200 Light, supra note 199, at 520.
201 See id. at 521.
202 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS ch. 9 (1993)
(criticizing the use of cost-benefit analysis for its treatment of human and
environmental values as commodities); MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2004) (arguing that environmental economics fails to provide accurate
valuation); Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 4 REGULATION 33
(1981) (noting that there are good reasons to question valuations placed on nonmarketed costs and benefits).

University of California, Davis

1900

[Vol. 50:1845

examine and weigh all the relevant considerations systematically.203 In
this light, our existing statutory structures might be reinterpreted to
include the concerns associated with the wrongful benefit principle
alongside the concerns that stem from environmental, economic, and
social impacts in the future.
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss the legal and customary
institutions governing the global Arctic. Our discussion focuses on
how these existing institutions might effectuate these three policy
proposals. We begin with a focus on international governance regimes,
which will inevitably determine the fate of the Arctic, but we also
address domestic law in the United States.
B. Global Arctic Governance
Both formal global governance through the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and informal
governance through the Arctic Council should take account of the
wrongful benefit principle in decisions and policies concerning Arctic
resources.204
1.

UNCLOS

UNCLOS represents an “unprecedented attempt by the international
community to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses
of the ocean, and thus bring a stable order to mankind’s very source of
life.”205 The Convention addresses navigational rights, territorial sea
203 See Kelman, supra note 202, at 33 (“At the broadest and vaguest level, costbenefit analysis may be regarded simply as systematic thinking about decisionmaking.”); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 931,
934 (2000) (“The framework of costs and benefits has a very extensive reach, going
well beyond the variables that get standardized attention in the usual techniques
associated with the application of cost-benefit analysis.”). And cost-benefit analysis
need not be inherently deregulatory. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008).
204 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS];
ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (Sept.
19, 1996), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF [hereinafter Ottowa
Declaration]. While the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, it is a member of
the Arctic Council.
205 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective,
U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA (1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm [hereinafter Historical
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limits, economic jurisdiction, and conservation of marine life, among
other issues, and provides a dispute resolution procedure between
states.206 Opened for signature in 1982, the Convention entered into
force in 1994.207 Of particular interest for our purposes, UNCLOS
might be used to implement either the moratorium or the
informational governance scheme that we suggest.
UNCLOS’s most important provisions relating to Arctic drilling are
those defining control over ocean resources. Article 76 defines the
continental shelf of coastal States generally as the area to a distance of
200 nautical miles — but potentially up to 350 miles — from certain
geographic baselines.208 This scheme leaves large swathes of the
world’s oceans — including the Arctic — outside the jurisdiction of
any nation. All rights to the “Area” beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction,209 are “vested in mankind as a whole” and minerals may
only be recovered from this Area in accordance with the terms of the
Convention.210 UNCLOS specifically grants the governing body the
power to limit the production of minerals, which includes oil and
natural gas.211 In general, UNCLOS adopts a cost-benefit type
approach, recognizing the need to balance economic development and
environmental concerns with orderly management of resources and
international cooperation.212

Perspective].
206 Id.
207 Id. The United States is the only Arctic State that is not party to the UNCLOS,
because the Senate has yet to ratify it. See Michael A. Becker, International Law of the
Sea, 43 INT’L L. 915, 915-17 (2009) (detailing historical rejections by the Senate of the
UNCLOS); Emily Yehle, Congress Won’t Ratify Law of the Sea This Year — Murkowski,
GREENWIRE (June 9, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2016/06/09/stories/
1060038570. Because it is the available mechanism for formal cooperative governance
in the Arctic, the United States Senate should ratify it.
208 UNCLOS, supra note 204, art. 76, §§ 1, 5. Under articles 55 and 56(1) of
UNCLOS, nations have exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources in their
“Exclusive Economic Zone” (EEZ), which overlaps with the continental shelf. Id. arts.
55, 56(1), 57. If exploitation of resources occurs beyond the EEZ, the coastal State
must make “payments of contributions in kind” to distribute them to other States
Parties to the Convention. Id. art. 82. See also Historical Perspective, supra note 205, at
Setting Limits; UNCLOS, art. 77, § 1 (“The coastal State exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources.”).
209 UNCLOS, supra note 204, art. 1, § 1.
210 Id. art. 137; see also id. art. 140 (“benefit of mankind”).
211 Id. art. 151(9). For the definition of minerals, see id. art. 133.
212 See id. art. 150.
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While neither the wrongful benefit principle nor any close analog
explicitly appears among UNCLOS’s listed objectives, we believe that
its objectives should be construed broadly. In particular, a variety of
phrases might open the door to considerations like those embodied in
the wrongful benefit principle. Article 150 calls for “rational
management of the resources.”213 UNCLOS states throughout that the
resources are a “common heritage” to be used “for the benefit of
mankind.”214 And it also repeatedly calls for prices that are “just” and
“fair to consumers.”215 In reviewing activities, UNCLOS calls for
assessment of whether development “result[s] in the equitable sharing
of benefits.”216 While it is possible to read all of this language as
consistent with a narrow focus on balancing economic and
environmental consequences, we believe that a more inclusive, openended reading is equally plausible and much more felicitous. The
generic vocabulary of listing objectives and encouraging cost-benefit
analysis should not force us to abandon backward-looking, nonconsequentialist considerations.
Beyond this interpretive suggestion, we specifically recommend
amending UNCLOS to require information disclosure regarding the
location of extraction of any resources from either the Area or the
continental shelf of member States that has been exposed as a result of
melting Arctic ice. That is, we recommend inserting a requirement
that minerals extracted from previously inaccessible areas of the Arctic
be labeled as such. In tandem, we recommend the creation of a global
certification process that fossil fuels extracted from other areas do not
come from the Arctic. Such a disclosure/certification regime would
mark these goods as “tainted,” just as the Kimberley Process requires a
certification that diamonds were not mined from conflict areas. As in
the Kimberley Process, the hope would be that member States would
agree formally not to trade in such Arctic resources or, at least, to
restrict trade. In this way, a certification would allow both those who
would extract and those who would purchase fossil fuels from the
Arctic to condemn the exploitation of wrongfully obtained resources.

213

Id. art. 150(b).
See id. at preamble; see also id. arts. 136, 150(i), 153(1) (explaining that
UNCLOS’s governing body operates “on behalf of mankind as a whole”).
215 Id. arts. 150(f), 151(1)(a).
216 Id. art. 155(f); see also id. art. 160(2)(g).
214
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The Arctic Council

Formal mechanisms under UNCLOS are not the only route to
incorporating the wrongful benefit principle. It may be easier to adopt
such a measure through informal channels in the first instance, before
formal mechanisms can be put into place.
In particular, one such informal channel — the Arctic Council —
already exists and could likewise play an important role. In September
1989, officials from the eight Arctic States, including the United States,
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the
Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and
Sweden, met to discuss “cooperative measures to protect the Arctic
environment.”217 In 1996, the Arctic Council was formally established
as an intergovernmental forum that seeks to “provide a means for
promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic
States.”218 In addition to the eight member States, there are Permanent
Participants to represent the interests of indigenous communities, and
other state and non-governmental observers.219
The Council operates by consensus among the Arctic States,220 with
issues being considered through six Working Groups and occasional
Task Forces to address specific matters of concern.221 While the
Council has adopted two legally binding agreements,222 for the most
part, the Council’s role is as a forum for cooperation. The Council has

217 See
Frequently Asked Questions, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/faq.
218 Ottowa Declaration, supra note 204, at Part 1(a). Its mission specifically
excludes issues relating to military security. Id., at Part 1(a) n.1.
219 Heather A. Conley & Matthew Melino, An Arctic Redesign: Recommendations to
Rejuvenate the Arctic Council, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Feb. 6, 2016),
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/160302_
Conley_ArcticRedesign_Web.pdf; The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder, ARCTIC COUNCIL
(2016), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (discussing increased
interest and participation in Council by observer states and NGOs) [hereinafter A
Backgrounder].
220 Ottowa Declaration, supra note 204, at part 7.
221 A Backgrounder, supra note 219, at 1-2.
222 See AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON MARINE OIL POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE IN THE ARCTIC (2013), http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/N813EN.pdf (providing for a
binding agreement on marine oil in the Arctic); AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON
AERONAUTICAL AND MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE IN THE ARCTIC (2011),
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/529/EDOCS-2068-v1ACMMSE08_KIRUNA_2013_agreement_on_oil_pollution_preparedness_and_response_
signedAppendices_Original_130510.PDF (providing for a binding agreement on search
and rescue methods in the Arctic).
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no power to implement or enforce any agreements; each Arctic State
must instead adopt domestic implementing legislation.223
We suggest that the Council create a Working Group or a Task
Force to discuss the newly accessible oil and gas resources in the
Arctic. Among outcomes from such a forum might be either a
moratorium or the adoption of an informational governance regime
like the Kimberley Process that would require certifications that fossil
fuels extracted by its members do not come from newly accessible
Arctic waters.224 These discussions should address concerns about
wrongfully exploiting climate change, which, though backwardlooking, dovetails with the Council’s focus on issues of environmental
concern. Ultimately, individual member States would then be
responsible for adopting legislation effectuating the terms of any
agreement on a moratorium or an informational governance regime.
An informal global approach to the management of common pool
resources in the Arctic is not without precedent. In July 2015, outside
the auspices of the Arctic Council, Canada, Denmark (in respect of
Greenland), Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States
signed a declaration to “prevent unregulated commercial fishing” in
the central Arctic Ocean.225 The Declaration noted that while
commercial fishing would not likely occur in the near future, a
precautionary approach was warranted, given the likely future
trajectory of the Arctic climate.226 Signatories committed to adopt
“interim” measures to facilitate “proper management of living marine
resources in the Arctic Ocean.”227 These interim measures include
joint programs of scientific research, permitting vessels to conduct
commercial fishing only in accordance with the terms of fisheries
223 See A Backgrounder, supra note 219, at 2. We note that the same holds true for
the Kimberley Process. See supra Part II.D.
224 See supra Part II.D.
225 DECLARATION CONCERNING THE PREVENTION OF UNREGULATED HIGH SEAS FISHING IN
THE ARCTIC OCEAN 1 (2015), https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/
vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf [hereinafter HIGH SEAS
FISHING]; Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Arctic Nations Sign Declaration to
Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing], https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2015/07/244969.htm.
226 Id. Such an approach, to the extent that it permits and even encourages
overlapping governance by global and domestic law, could be thought of as an
extension of the notion of precautionary federalism to the global sphere Cf. Sarah E.
Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333 (2017)
(extending the concept of precaution from a guide for substantive regulation to the
allocation of regulatory authority within the federal system in the United States).
227 HIGH SEAS FISHING, supra note 225, at 1.

2017]

Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling

1905

management programs, and coordinating monitoring activities.228
Delegates from these nations, as well as other countries with major
commercial fishing fleets that are not Arctic states (such as China),
continued these discussions in 2016.229 This Declaration relating to
fisheries management could provide a template for informal global
governance of Arctic fossil fuel resources — either under the auspices
of the Arctic Council or through other global means. As with the case
of fishing, exploration for fossil fuels is inchoate in the Arctic. A
precautionary approach similarly makes sense to address this problem
before there are more entrenched interests supporting unregulated
drilling. And any global governance regime should include not only
those nations that border the Arctic, but also those nations that play a
significant role in fossil fuel extraction globally.
C. Domestic Legal Governance
While the application of the wrongful benefit principle to Arctic
drilling is a global concern, it is important to consider the role of
domestic law for two reasons. First, as noted above, domestic
legislation may be required to effectuate a global regime. But second,
portions of the Arctic — namely, various nations’ continental shelves
— are under the jurisdiction of those individual nations. In the United
States, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) is the primary
domestic statute governing oil and gas extraction in the Arctic
waters.230 The President plays a key role in determining an overall
plan for development of Arctic resources, and retains the statutory
authorization under OCSLA to withdraw unleased areas from oil and
gas development.231 As we have noted, on December 20, 2016,
228

Id. at 2.
Hannah Hoag, Nations Negotiate Fishing in Arctic High Seas, ARTIC DEEPLY (Apr.
28, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/articles/2016/04/28/nations-negotiatefishing-in-arctic-high-seas.
230 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2012). The
Outer Continental Shelf includes “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of
the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined [in this title], and of which the
subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction
and control.” Id. § 1331(a). Drilling also implicates other legal obligations under
related environmental statutes. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012) (requiring disclosure of significant impacts on the
environment); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)
(protecting endangered species from harm); Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311–1377 (2012) (aiming to promote the “chemical, physical, and biological
integrity to the Nation’s waters.”).
231 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012).
229
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President Obama withdrew from commercial oil and gas exploration
the Chukchi Sea Planning Area and the Beaufort Sea Planning Area
(with certain exceptions) by Presidential Memorandum pursuant to
section 12(a) of OCSLA. He cited, in support of his decision, concerns
regarding environmental impacts.232 This determination — though
now contested as a result of President Trump’s Executive Order on
Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy — was
consistent with the wrongful benefit principle, even if President
Obama’s reasoning did not take the principle expressly into account.
We recommend that future administrations consider the wrongful
benefit principle — in addition to forward-looking concerns about
environmental impact — in deciding whether to permit any future
leasing under OCSLA or whether to continue indefinitely the existing
Arctic leasing withdrawal. And to the extent that Congress considers
the bill proposing to overturn the withdrawal, we recommend that
members of Congress likewise take into consideration the wrongful
benefit principle.
OCSLA tends to take a cost-benefit approach, focusing on
preventing harmful environmental impacts, while promoting the
energy and resource needs of the United States.233 Likewise, the 2013
National Strategy for the Arctic and the 2014 Implementation Plan for
the National Strategy both recognize the need to balance these
competing environmental, economic, and strategic concerns.234
OCSLA sets forth a four-stage process to develop an oil well on the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),235 and the wrongful benefit principle
should inform decisions at each stage. First, the DOI formulates a fiveyear leasing plan; second, the Department conducts a lease sale; third,
the lessee must submit various plans to the DOI including regarding
oil spill response; and finally, if the DOI approves the plan, and
exploration reveals oil or gas, the lessee must submit a “development

232

See supra note 120.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (noting that the OCS is a “vital national resource
reserve held by the Federal Government for the public” that should be made available
for development, while taking into account environmental concerns).
234 DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL ARCTIC STRATEGY 7 (2013); IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 14 (2014); see also National Security
Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (Jan. 2009),
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm; Exec. Order 12,501, 3 C.F.R. 328
(1985); Exec. Order 13,547, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,580, 3 C.F.R.
258 (2011).
235 Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984); see 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1337(a)–(b), 1340(c)(1), 1344(a), 1351(a)(1).
233
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and production plan” to the Department for approval.236 The DOI
should consider the wrongful benefit principle at several stages of this
process.
OCSLA contains broad language enumerating the multiple values
that the Secretary of the Interior must consider in managing the OCS,
including “economic, social, and environmental values of the
renewable and nonrenewable resources.”237 While recognizing the
important goal of developing national energy resources, OCSLA also
acknowledges that “[t]iming and location of exploration,
development, and production of oil and gas” should include
consideration of “an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
environmental risks.”238 The law broadly authorizes the Secretary to
reject a development and production plan if the advantages of
disapproving it outweigh the advantages.239
This is broad, normatively laden language. Pursuing “social values”
could include ensuring compliance with the wrongful benefit
principle, for example in a determination of the appropriate locations
for such leases, and whether these locations are newly accessible in
light of melting Arctic ice.240 We believe that such considerations
belong alongside considerations of potential economic gain and
environmental harm in the Secretary’s determinations regarding Arctic
drilling. Whether this outcome can be accomplished through
regulatory interpretation or requires statutory amendment is less
important to our proposal than the overarching principle.241
The 2016 withdrawal of the Arctic OCS from leasing was certainly a
salutary development. But it is limited. It does not govern those areas
of the Arctic under global governance or under the jurisdiction of
other nations and the new Administration, and members of Congress
are already attempting to reverse this action.242 Thus, it remains to be
seen precisely what will be the state of play of Arctic waters even
under the jurisdiction of the United States, which is only part of the
global puzzle. We believe that continuing review — at all levels — of
236

Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2015).
43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1) (2012).
238 Id. § 1344(a)(2).
239 Id. U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1)(D).
240 Because review of actions under OCSLA is provided under the arbitrary and
capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2012), the Secretary of the Interior is vested with significant discretion.
241 We recognize, of course, that statutory amendment would be a more complex
process than mere interpretation by the agency or adoption of regulations.
242 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
237
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drilling in newly accessible regions of the Arctic should factor in the
wrongful benefit principle.
CONCLUSION
The wrongful benefit principle, as we have described it, seeks to
capture our widely shared commitment to the impermissibility of
exploiting bad acts for one’s own gain. This commitment manifests
itself across such a diversity of different legal doctrines — what
biologists might describe as “convergent evolution”243 — that it is hard
to doubt the existence of some underlying normative pull. The best
way to probe and understand this normative phenomenon is by
thinking about new cases that challenge its various dimensions and
boundaries.
The opening of Arctic waters for new drilling opportunities — a
pressing and controversial matter of global import — presents just such
a new and difficult case. We contend that efforts to drill in the Arctic fall
within the aegis of multiple forms of the wrongful benefit principle,
generating both perpetrator-oriented and object-oriented obligations.
But one need not share all of our conclusions in this regard to think that
the wrongful benefit principle applies in some respect. While
consideration of the wrongful benefit principle is not outcomedeterminative — rather, it must be weighed against competing
considerations, including environmental, strategic, and economic
consequences — we hope to have made the case that it deserves
consideration by nations around the globe, as well as domestic agencies,
the President, and Congress in weighing how to act in the Arctic. Our
concrete aim is to put these considerations on the table.
But we also have a more theoretical interest in the wrongful benefit
principle itself. Our aim, in this regard, has been to use the case of the
Arctic to explore the principle’s contours. That project, of course,
matters to all sorts of cases in which parties might gain through the
exploitation of wrongdoing or collective failure. Gun manufacturers
profit from the occurrence of mass shootings and terrorist attacks,
sometimes even drawing on these events for advertising fodder.244
243 See, e.g., GEORGE MCGHEE, CONVERGENT EVOLUTION: LIMITED FORMS MOST
BEAUTIFUL xi (2011) (“[I]n many cases we see that evolution has produced the same
form — or a very similar one — over and over again in many independent species
lineages, repeatedly, on timescales of hundreds of millions of years.”).
244 See Evan Osnos, Making a Killing: Business and the Politics of Selling Guns, NEW
YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/27/afterorlando-examining-the-gun-business/ (explaining that “[i]n recent years, in response
to three kinds of events — mass shootings, terrorist attacks, and talk of additional gun
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Some companies have begun thriving off the current refugee crisis in
Europe, as overwhelmed states and municipalities outsource service
provision.245 Like Arctic drilling, these are hard, complex cases. But
there is something that gives us pause here, and there is some
principle behind that pause. There are considerations about where an
opportunity has come from that are worth taking seriously.

control — gun sales have broken records,” and describing gun industry strategy to
encourage concealed carry weapons as a response).
245 See Antony Loewenstein, How Private Companies Are Exploiting the Refugee Crisis for
Profit, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/howcompanies-have-been-exploiting-the-refugee-crisis-for-profit-a6706587.html/ (“A grim
reality of the current migrant crisis sweeping Europe . . . is the growing number of
corporations seeing financial opportunity in the most vulnerable people.”).

